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Abstract
The Project on Government Oversight listed 632 reported acts of government contractor
misconduct since 2007 that resulted in settlements or fines totaling $41.95 billion in the
government contracting industry. Government contracting officials changed the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2009 to reduce acts of misconduct. The purpose of this
causal-comparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 significantly
reduced the rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact of the
change on government contractor ethics business processes. Deterrence theory guided
this study of how the change to the FAR in 2009 impacted the rate of reported
government contractor misconduct (dependent variable) and government contractor
ethics business processes (dependent variable). Data were collected on the top 100
government contractors over 2 separate 3-year time periods (independent variable), 2006
through 2008 and 2010 through 2012, before and after the change to the FAR. Data
extracted from official government databases and government oversight organizations
included annual contract awards (n = 600), contractor misconduct reports (n = 600), and
contractor ethics business process records (n = 600). A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test
resulted in 2 findings. First, the rate of reported government contractor misconduct was
not significantly reduced by the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -0.949, p = .34, r = -.072.
Second, government contractor ethics business processes were significantly impacted by
the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -12.263, p < .001, r = -.763. This study may
contribute to positive social change by informing federal contracting authorities and
corporate executives that implementing ethics business processes did not reduce
misconduct. These findings call for further action to improve corporate ethical behavior.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
The U.S. government and governments throughout the world are concerned with
reducing expenses (Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). Employing contractors can mitigate that
concern by creating efficiencies and reducing government expenses (Hansson &
Holmgren, 2011). Employing contractors reduces cost and increases efficiency by
reducing government infrastructure and streamlining business processes (Herbert &
Rothwell, 2013).
Government contracting began in colonial America but reliance on contracting
has increased since George Washington’s use in the 1770s (Jenks, 2010). Kean (2011)
discovered that during World War II, between 1940 and 1944, the U.S. government spent
$175 billion on government contracts, resulting in a 1500% increase in contractor profits.
Government contracting dependence increased in the 1980s and 1990s because business
experts advised cost saving measures to increase efficiencies and adaptable business
processes (Terman & Yang, 2010). Government contracting companies comprised nine
of the top 10 U.S. businesses in 2009 (Hayden, Campbell, & Cummins, 2010). The U.S.
government employs contractors to reduce expenses; however, government contractors
seek to maximize profits (Cordery, Baskerville, & Porter, 2011). The desire for maximum
profit leads to contractor misconduct (Olusegun, Ogunbode, Ariyo, & Alibi, 2011). As a
result, increasing employment of government contractors increases the U.S.
government’s exposure to contractor misconduct (Roberts, 2010).
Representatives of the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) determined that
632 known instances of contractor misconduct have occurred since 2007 (POGO, 2014).

2
Corporations that committed the known acts of misconduct paid $41.9 billion in fines and
settlements (POGO, 2014). The U.S. government’s escalated employment of contractors
and increased exposure to contractor misconduct has resulted in numerous laws,
regulations, and government oversight programs designed to deter contractor misconduct
(Roberts, 2010).
The lack of oversight and contract clarity caused increased contractor misconduct
within the private security industry (Gomez del Prado, 2011). Warnock (2012) believed
political agendas, biased enforcement of contracting rules and regulations, and poor
oversight compromise the U.S. government’s ability to influence contractor misconduct.
I selected deterrence theory as the foundational theory for my study. Deterrence
theory explores the influencing of unethical or illegal activity through the threat of
imposed penalties or sanctions (Paternoster, 2010). Best (2013) listed prevention,
detection, and prosecution as the three components of deterrence theory. Dickinson
(2013) argued that oversight is the most important part of deterrence because it is the
foundation for accountability and prosecution. Compromising any of the three elements
will result in an ineffective deterrence program (Best, 2013).
The U.S. government changed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2009
(FAR, 2008). The change included self-reporting of contractor misconduct, ethics and
compliance programs, ethics training, and expanded debarment and suspension
enforcement (FAR, 2008). Government officials designed the change to deter contractor
misconduct (Dorey, Oehmen, & Valerdi, 2012).
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Congressional acts and U.S. government contracting official rule changes were
implemented to reduce instances of misconduct (Dorey et al, 2012). The Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 required that all contractor cost estimates be
within 80% of actual costs in an effort to reduce fraudulent pricing strategies (Dorey et
al., 2012). The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) empowered both
private citizens and the U.S. government in their role of policing contractor behavior
(Titolo, 2011). FERA was an extension of the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989
designed to protect those reporting misconduct (Titolo, 2011). The Close the Contractor
Fraud Loophole Act (CCFLA) required federal government contractors begin selfreporting all instances of misconduct in 2009 (Warnock, 2012). The Federal Awardee
Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) development began in 2009 as a
component of The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 2009.
Government officials designed FAPIIS to improve contractor responsibility through
shared awareness of contractor misconduct between government agencies (Nackman,
Rathbone, Myers, & Pannier, 2011; Warnock, 2012).
The U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight
investigated the federal government contracting industry due to continued contractor
misconduct (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). Warnock (2012) believed the U.S.
government’s contractor oversight program was ineffective without prosecuting
violations. Coleman (2011) believed that self-reporting has not improved corporate
ethical behavior. The U.S. government’s contractor misconduct deterrence program
lacked violation enforcement (Office of Small Business Programs [OSBP], 2011). I
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explored the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009 on
reducing contractor misconduct.
Background of the Problem
Instances of government contractor misconduct are traceable to 80 of the top 100
government contractors (POGO, 2014). Fines and settlements for misconduct total $41.9
billion since 2007 (POGO, 2014). The U.S. Senate’s concern about the seriousness of
contractor misconduct led the Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight to
investigate government contracting industry business practices (Sonn & Gebreselassie,
2010). The U.S. government instituted a change to the FAR in 2009 in an effort to reduce
misconduct violations (OSBP, 2011; POGO, 2014). Changes included whistleblower
protections, mandatory corporate ethics programs, and self-reporting of all misconduct
violations (OSBP, 2011). While reported instances of misconduct violations continue,
there is no information available to determine if the governmental changes and
requirements have reduced misconduct violations (OSBP, 2011; POGO, 2014).
The FAR (2014) lists penalties for contractor misconduct. Penalties for
misconduct include exclusion from bidding on current and future contracts, fines and
financial penalties, debarment of the offending contractor or individual, and prosecuting
individual violators and corporate executives. The punitive actions listed in the FAR are
designed to deter contractor misconduct (FAR, 2014; Roberts, 2010). Understanding the
effectiveness of the penalties on those committing acts of misconduct may help to
identify if the existing penalties reduce the propensity to commit misconduct violations
(Roberts, 2010).
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Despite the availability of information about the quantity of contractor
misconduct and governmental actions taken to reduce misconduct, academic information
on the effect of the U.S. government’s deterrent actions upon unethical behavior within
the federal government contracting industry is lacking. Statistical information on
contractor misconduct is available, as well as information on government actions to deter
misconduct within the federal government contracting industry. Understanding the
impact of change to the FAR in 2009 upon the contracting industry may lead to future
changes in government requirements, reporting procedures, and government penalties
that may lead to reductions in federal government contractor misconduct.
Problem Statement
There have been 632 reported misconduct violations resulting in settlements or
fines totaling $41.9 billion in the federal government contracting industry since 2007
(POGO, 2014). Researchers found instances of misconduct in 80% of the top 100
government contractors and 60 of the top 100 with multiple violations (POGO, 2014;
Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). The U.S. government created policy changes requiring
federal government contractors to self-report violations and to create business ethics
awareness and compliance programs (FAR, 2014). Misconduct violations result in the
U.S. government pursuing fines, terminations of contracts, debarment, suspension,
imprisonment, or a combination of these penalties in an effort to curtail future violations.
The general business problem is the rate of misconduct violations within the federal
government contracting industry. The specific business problem is the lack of
understanding regarding (a) how the change to the FAR in 2009 affected rate of reported
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federal government contractor misconduct and (b) the impact of the change on federal
government contractor ethics business processes.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 has influenced the
rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact of the change on
federal government contractor ethics business processes. The independent variable in this
study was time, which was divided into two parts. Time 1 was a 3-year (2006 through
2008) time period prior to the change to the FAR in 2009. Time 2 was a 3-year (2010
through 2012) time period after the change to the FAR in 2009. The two dependent
variables were the instances of reported contractor misconduct and the government
contractor ethics business processes. I conducted secondary quantitative research and
quantitative data collection to gather information.
Secondary quantitative research included reviewing and analyzing articles,
studies, and statistical data collected on past contractor misconduct violations.
Quantitative analysis indicated that the change to the FAR in 2009 did not significantly
reduce the instances of reported misconduct within the top 100 federal government
contractors. The top 100 government contractors represented 55% of government
contract awards for the 450,000 registered with the U.S. government (Federal
Procurement Data System [FPDS], 2014). The intent was to determine if the change to
the FAR in 2009 significantly affected the reported rates of reported contractor
misconduct or significantly impacted the government contractor ethics business
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processes. DeCremer, Mayer, and Schminke (2010) believed that reducing instances of
government contractor misconduct increases ethical conduct throughout the entire
organization and improves corporate social responsibility.
Nature of the Study
I proposed conducting a quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative design study. Data collection techniques included structured record reviews,
legal documents and findings, and statistical analysis of historical information retrieved
from government contract reporting databases. Collection and analysis of historical
information from government archives was consistent with Kristin and Robbins’s (2010)
belief that quantitative methodology is the best method for studies comprising historical
records and archived statistical information research.
Statistical information and data collection included online U.S. government and
government oversight organization databases. Quantitative methodology was best suited
for online statistical research (Barnham, 2012). Data collection efforts for this study
included information on federal government contractor misconduct instances from 2006
through 2012. Yu-Jia (2012) believed causal-comparative design was an effective choice
for researchers seeking to infer causality between a dependent variable and an ex post
facto independent variable.
Loidolt (2009) stated that the type of methodology is determined by what the
researcher is trying to determine. Qualitative methodology was the optimum choice to
determine decision-making reasons, values, and experiences; however, quantitative
methodology was the preeminent choice to measure the results at one or more points in
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time (Loidolt, 2009). Examining both the reported government contractor misconduct
rate and contractor ethics business processes for 3-year periods pre and post the change to
the FAR in 2009 made quantitative methodology the appropriate choice.
Research Question
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 had influenced the
rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact on federal
government contractor ethics business processes. The goal of the study was to determine
if a causal relationship existed between an independent variable (time before and after the
change to the FAR in 2009) and two dependent variables (rate of reported government
contractor misconduct and government contractor ethics business processes). I examined
reported contractor misconduct and components of contractor ethics programs for 3 years
prior to 2009 and for 3 years after 2009. The study of the independent variable consisted
of official government documents and regulations. The study of the dependent variables
consisted of government contractor oversight databases. The research questions for this
study included
1. Has the change to the FAR in 2009 reduced the rates of reported government
contractor misconduct?
2. Has the change to the FAR in 2009 affected government contractor ethics
business processes?
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Hypotheses
H10: There was no statistically significant decline in the rate of reported contractor
misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009.
H1a: There was a statistically significant decline in the rate of reported contractor
misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009.
H20: There was no statistically significant change in the government contractors
ethics business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009.
H2a: There was a statistically significant change in the government contractors ethics
business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009.
Theoretical Framework
My study was based upon deterrence theory. Simply stated, deterrence theory is
the threat of imposed penalties or sanctions to prevent illegal or unethical acts
(Paternoster, 2010). A key component of deterrence is the perceived possibility of
detecting misconduct (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Dickinson (2013) stated that oversight
is an important part of deterrence because it is the foundation for accountability and
prosecution. Paternoster (2010) believed deterrence is the foundation of legal systems.
Laws are created, penalties and punishments are determined for violating the law,
violations are discovered, and penalties imposed, all with the hope that the mere threat of
punishment modifies behavior (Paternoster, 2010).
Paternoster (2010) stated that the intellectual study of deterrence theory is traced
to the writings of Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789). According to Paternoster,
Beccaria’s (1764) work On Crimes and Punishments was a collection of nine principles.

10
Beccaria’s principles ranged from linking human motivation to wanting pleasure or
avoiding pain to establishing a scale matching punishments to crimes (Paternoster, 2010).
Moreover, Beccaria’s nine principles helped inform early understanding of deterrence
theory (Paternoster, 2010). Bentham’s (1789) work An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation was a coupling of prospective punishments and penalties attached
to the principles espoused by Beccaria (Paternoster, 2010). Bentham believed that
punishments must be harsh enough to outweigh the prospective reward of mischievous
behavior and applied without regarding outside considerations (Paternoster, 2010).
Paternoster believed that Beccaria and Bentham together formed deterrence theory.
Deterrence theory is effective if two aspects are present (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010;
Qing, Zhengchuan, Tamara, & Hong, 2011). First, individuals must believe their
misconduct is likely to be discovered (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Secondly, punishment
must exceed the potential reward for misconduct violations (Qing et al., 2011).
Ogilvie and Stewart (2010) believed that the likelihood of discovery is the
greatest deterrent. The U.S. government conducts contract audits and uses contractor selfreporting to discover misconduct (OSBP, 2011). Self-reporting is the U.S. government’s
solution for detecting misconduct that otherwise may go undetected (Bhojwani, 2012).
Qing et al. (2011) stated that the voluntary disclosure of acts of misconduct is contrary to
normal behavior and is therefore a questionable method for discovering misconduct. Selfreporting influences the deferment of punishment for voluntarily reporting misconduct
(Coleman, 2011). Furthermore, Coleman (2011) believed that if the punishment for selfreporting were the same as for outside discovery, then concealing acts of misconduct are
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more likely than self-reporting misconduct. The U.S. government’s emphasis on selfreporting runs counter to the belief that increasing the probability of detection is the most
important factor for reducing unethical conduct (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010).
Ogilvie and Stewart (2010) believed that as penalty severity increased, so does the
deterrent effect. Furthermore, Qing et al. (2011) found that deterrence is rendered
ineffective when an individual perceives the benefit of an unethical behavior was greater
than the probability of punishment. The U.S. government’s implementation of the
prescribed penalties for misconduct is subjective and may not be effective (FAR, 2014;
OSBP, 2011).
Understanding the use and effectiveness of deterrence theory in areas outside of
the business world is important. Reviewing academic literature in other areas such as
speed limits (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), corporate antitrust actions (Lande &
Davis, 2011), nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction (O’Neil, 2011), and
information security policies (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012) showed how deterrence
theory effectiveness can be determined within the federal government contracting
industry. Understanding the effectiveness of deterrence in general helped determine if the
government’s actions to reduce misconduct and the change to the FAR in 2009 are
deterring misconduct. Qing et al. (2011) believed that the perceived cost and benefit of a
behavior influences an individual’s behavioral decision. Ogilvie and Stewart (2010)
found that perceived cost and benefit affected the propensity for unethical behavior.
Determining the deterrent effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 was necessary before
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considering why the change was or was not effective. My quantitative study indicated the
effectiveness of the change to the FAR in 2009 in deterring misconduct.
Definition of Terms
The following definitions were key terms used within the study.
Change to the FAR in 2009: In November 2008, members of the FAR Council
issued a change to the FAR for fiscal year 2009 (FAR, 2008). The change included
mandatory ethics awareness and compliance programs, mandatory self-reporting of
contractor misconduct, mandatory written code of business ethics and conduct,
mandatory ethics awareness and compliance employee training, and potential debarment
or suspension for noncompliance to the changes (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2008).
Contracting officer representative (COR): CORs are U.S. government contracting
officials that have received training in contract administration and are responsible for
contract administration and contractor oversight (Karstrom, 2013).
Contracting officer technical representative (COTR): COTRs are U.S.
government officials responsible for performing contractor oversight on technical
contracts (Karstrom, 2013). Karstrom (2013) stated that COTRs might not have contract
administrative training.
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS): Warnock
(2012) defined CPARS as the U.S. government’s database designed to store the procuring
contracting officer’s report on contractor performance.
Corporate ethics programs: The FAR (2014) defined corporate ethics programs
as mandatory structured corporate programs designed to foster ethical awareness and
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corporate compliance to ethical processes and procedures. Exact corporate ethics
program requirements are listed in FAR part 32.203.1 and included ethical behavior
standards, procedures, communications plans, training, compliance, internal control
system, periodic reviews, and reporting procedures (FAR, 2014).
Debarment: Tillipman (2013) defined debarment as the exclusion of a federal
contractor from any contract or subcontract award for a period not exceeding 3 years.
Debarment action applies to an individual, corporate affiliate, entire government
contracting corporation, or any combination thereof (Tillipman, 2013).
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): The FAR is the primary regulatory
document governing U.S. government agency contracting and acquisition efforts (FAR,
2014).
Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS):
Willard (2013) stated that FAPIIS is the publically available, U.S. government database
that stores contractor performance records and reports. The FAPIIS database combines
information from CPARS and SAM (Willard, 2013).
Federal government contractor: A federal government contractor is a business
entity that is registered as an active participant in the Central Contractor Registry (FAR,
2014).
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS): FPDS is the U.S. government’s
procurement award repository that provides public access to federal procurement
spending information (FPDS, 2014)
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Government Accountability Office (GAO): The GAO is the U.S. government
agency that provides oversight on all federal government spending (Healthcare Financial
Management Association [HFM], 2011).
Government penalties: Government penalties are actions the U.S. government
imposes upon a federal government contractor that committed misconduct. Government
penalties include exclusion from contract bid, fines and financial penalties, restitution,
debarment, and prosecution of individual violators and corporate executives (FAR,
2014).
Misconduct: Misconduct is an intentional or unintentional violation of FAR part
52.203-13, the Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct, or other applicable
contract clauses (FAR, 2014). The FAR (2014) provides a list of misconduct violations
including fraud, improper pricing, human resource violations, and other legal or ethical
violations as defined by the FAR and applicable contract clauses.
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP): Lessack (2013)
stated that the OFFCP provides oversight on federal government contractor performance
and contract compliance.
Project on Government Oversight (POGO): POGO is an independent
organization that investigates government contractor misconduct and maintains a
contractor misconduct database on the top 100 government contractors (Warnock, 2012).
System for Award Management (SAM): SAM is the U.S. government’s centralized
contractor registry where all federal government contractors must register and maintain
an active status to participate in contract awards (FAR, 2014).
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Top 100 federal government contractors: The top 100 federal government
contractors are the top 100 federal government contractors listed by contract obligation
dollars for a given fiscal year (FPDS, 2014).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
The following assumptions were considered true for this study. I researched
multiple sources to ensure the accuracy of all archived and statistical data. Government
statistical information and the legal documentation available were accurate, complete,
and factual. The archived data, academic sources, and peer-reviewed references were
accurate, unbiased, and factual.
Limitations
The study’s considered limitations included the statistical reliance on the U.S.
government contracting industry’s self-reporting procedures and the reliance on public
documentation regarding information on sealed legal settlements and classified contract
vehicle violations. Quantifying previous research and studies was a potential limitation.
Replication of information and findings due to similarities in secondary research
materials, topics, participants, and organizations was an additional limitation.
The ex post facto nature of causal-comparative design was a limitation (Brewer &
Kuhn, 2010). Researchers using an ex post facto design cannot control the variables
because variable manipulation has already occurred (Brewer & Kuhn, 2010). Brewer and
Kuhn (2010) stated that the inability to conduct random sampling is a limitation of
causal-comparative design.
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Delimitations
I collected data from FPDS, SAM, FAPIIS, and POGO. Collecting and comparing
data from multiple sources reduced the limitation of reliance on government contractor
self-reporting and publically available documentation. Careful review of secondary data
when collecting data and compiling statistical information decreased the risk of
duplicating data collected from similar sources. The delimitation for random sampling is
purposive sampling (Brewer & Kuhn, 2010). Purposive sampling is the intentional
selection of a homogeneous subset from a population (Huck, Beavers, & Esquivel, 2010).
I selected the top 100 federal government contractors from the 450,000 registered and
active government contractors (FPDS, 2014).
I conducted focused research and allowed for the concentrated study of statistical
information associated with the top 100 federal government contractors. I controlled
personal bias by using proven research tools, trusted materials, and approved methods to
collect information. I used SPSS to perform data collation and analysis.
Significance of the Study
Reduction of Gaps
Available academic literature indicated that regulations and penalties designed to
deter unethical or illegal behavior had mixed results. Lande and Davis (2011) found that
Department of Justice anticartel policies had no effect upon antitrust violations. O’Neil
(2011) discussed the positive effect of deterrence in the nuclear arms race and Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Government-imposed self-reporting
requirements and costly penalties have not improved corporate ethical behavior in the
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pharmaceutical industry (Coleman, 2011). Lande and Davis found that governmental
deterrent actions led to reductions in unethical or illegal behavior within private industry.
The OSBP (2011) listed government programs, policies, and procedures for deterring
misconduct within the federal government contracting industry, yet information is
unavailable on the effectiveness of these deterrent efforts.
Findings from the doctoral study provided researchers, academicians, and U.S.
government leaders information on the effectiveness of deterrent measures and their
influence on corporate ethical behavior. The findings provided the federal government
contracting industry with information to aid in reducing or deterring misconduct. The
findings informed leaders throughout the federal government contracting industry on the
trends in contractor misconduct and government oversight.
Implications for Social Change
This quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-comparative study
involved understanding the effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 on reported
government contractor misconduct and on government contractor ethics business
processes. The U.S. government mandates corporate ethics programs to reduce instances
of misconduct (FAR, 2014). Reducing instances of misconduct may improve ethical
behavior and responsibility throughout the organization (DeCremer et al., 2010). Yolles
and Sawagvudcharee (2010) believed that misconduct stems from placing private gain
over all other interests within an organization. The corporate ethics program’s purpose is
to affect all corporate stakeholders positively, which include employees, U.S. government
customers, and the American people (DeCremer et al., 2010).
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Understanding the effectiveness of the change to the FAR in 2009 on reducing
instances of government contractor misconduct helps the U.S. government determine if
further action is required. Furthermore, understanding the effect of the change to the FAR
in 2009 on government contractor ethics business processes helps government contractors
determine if further change is needed. Instances of misconduct are found throughout an
organization and not confined to a single area (Cragg, Arnold, & Muchlinski, 2012).
Reducing instances of government contractor misconduct increases the probability of
reducing unethical conduct throughout an organization and benefit the corporate
stakeholders (DeCremer et al., 2010).
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
I conducted a literature review to further understand the history of government
contracting, government contracting misconduct, and the deterrent steps the U.S.
government took to reduce contractor misconduct. I searched university provided
electronic databases. The electronic databases I primarily used were Business Source
Complete, ABI/INFORM Complete, and Military and Government Collection. The
keywords used for the search on contractor misconduct included contract violations,
contractor misconduct, government contractor, ethics violations, and contractor ethics. I
reviewed 70 articles from 41 journals. Furthermore, I reviewed archived information on
two trusted government websites.
Through my review, I found that decreasing the expense of government was a
global concern (Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). The business of government never declines
thus creating a need to find other ways to reduce costs (Terman & Yang, 2010).
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Government contracting fills the cost savings need through reduced government size. The
U.S. government employs federal government contractors to reduce costs and create
efficiencies (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). Contracting governmental services cost less
than paying government employees in those same roles (Kilbride, 2010). Employing
contractors enables the government to reduce costs and increase efficiencies through
force reduction and streamlining of business processes (Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). Cost
savings are a result of contracting services for shorter terms and eliminating the costs of
missed time and long-term cost of retirement pensions (Parker, 2010). Business
efficiencies result from federal contractors functioning in a dynamic business
environment where government organizations function in a bureaucratic environment
(Herbert & Rothwell, 2013).
Government Contracting
Reducing the cost of government services is not a new concept. George
Washington employed contractors for services and support during the Revolutionary War
(Jenks, 2010). Jenks (2010) believed the U.S. government began employing contractors
to meet requirements; however, reasoning shifted to employing contractors for increased
efficiency and cost effectiveness. Government contracting continued and increased
throughout U.S. history (Kaen, 2011). Kaen (2011) found that DuPont increased
corporate profits by 990% during a 3-year period in World War I. The U.S. government
spent over $175 billion in government contracts from 1940 to 1944 (Kaen, 2011). The top
100 contractors were awarded the majority contracts with $35 billion awarded to the top
five contractors (Kaen, 2011). Kaen determined that the increase in contracting resulted
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in increased contractor profits of 1500% from 1939 to 1944. Increased contractor profits
led Congress to investigate 6,900 federal contractors (Kaen, 2011).
Government contractor critics suggested that the higher profit margins of
contractors were due to unethical business practices and not because of lower capital
investments and lower overhead costs (Wang & San Miguel, 2012). Business experts
promoted increased contracting during the 1980s and 1990s to improve government
efficiency and reduce government spending (Terman & Yang, 2010). Jenks (2010)
believed that increased contracting led to problems measuring efficiency due to the
government’s inability to determine the number of contractors deployed to support Iraq
and Afghanistan. Dickinson (2013) found that the contractor to troop ratio in Afghanistan
and Iraq was approximately 1-to-1. U.S. government officials believed the number of
contractors exceeded the number of U.S. military members in the Iraqi Theater (Jenks,
2010).
Government contracting has continued increasing in the United States (Dickinson,
2013). Hayden et al. (2010) found that nine of the top 10 U.S. business conglomerates
were government-contracting organizations. The conglomerates have operated businesses
throughout the United States and wielded significant political influence down to
congressional districts (Hayden et al., 2010). Hayden et al. believed the government
contracting industry’s political influence has increased dramatically in the last 50 years.
The industry’s influence is seen in the increased contract spending over the past
15 years to a total of over $560 billion annually (Amey, 2012). Mori and Doni (2010)
found that government contracting accounted for 20% of the U.S. gross domestic product
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(GDP). Mori and Doni believed that job creation is a byproduct of America’s dependence
upon government contracting. U.S. government contracting companies provided millions
of jobs (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) found that
government contractor jobs increased by 43% between 2000 and 2006.
The decline in government provided services caused the U.S. government’s
increased reliance on contracting (Knott, 2011). Moreover, government provided
services, such as interrogation and force protection, transitioned to government
contractors in 2001 (Jenks, 2010). Military contractors performed support roles in
wartime that allow the military to focus on combat operations (Kilbride, 2010). Karstrom
(2013) believed that contractors coexist where military presence is required. The U.S.
government turned to government contractors for other services such as human resources
(HR), finance and accounting, equipment repair and maintenance, and logistical support
(Herbert & Rothwell, 2013).
Howlett and Migone (2013) found government services contracting growth
beyond normal services to policy-making and organizational management activities.
Krishnan (2011) stated that the U.S. government has historically employed government
contractors in intelligence operations. The use of contractors in intelligence expanded
between the end of the Cold War and the late 1990s to approach 70% of the 2009
Intelligence budget. Moreover, the U.S. government has spent approximately $50 billion
annually for contracted services related to intelligence (Krishnan, 2011).
The U.S. government’s reliance on contractors has been because of a desire for
faster response, innovative thinking, accomplishing targeted objectives, precision skill
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sets, efficiencies, and cost savings (Krishnan, 2012; Parker 2010). This reliance was due
to a desire to promote economic prosperity (Parker, 2010). However, the result was the
U.S. government’s reliance on contractors to perform governmental functions and made
the government susceptible to increased political costs, legal complications, and instances
of contractor misconduct (Demessie, 2012).
Demessie (2012) stated that government officials contradict themselves in
contracting. Government officials created rules and regulations to decrease misconduct,
yet they created rules and regulations that foster a business atmosphere that increases the
propensity for misconduct (Demessie, 2012). Congress determined the federal
government contracting industry practiced widespread fraud in 2007 (Titolo, 2011).
Maser and Thompson (2011) stated the government contracting process is rife with
misconduct opportunities. Clarke (2012) found that contractors believed the bidding
process was corrupt; however, the contractors did not believe that employees within their
own organization behave unethically.
Hayden et al. (2010) stated that government contracting continued to increase
despite widespread fraud, corruption, waste, and nonperformance. Lewis and Bajari
(2011) determined that highway construction contractors cost the state of California 1.2
billion annually due to failure to meet contract requirements. The need to deter contractor
misconduct and maximize the benefit of U.S. government contracting for services led to
increased laws, regulations, and government oversight programs (Roberts, 2010).
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Government Contracting Misconduct
The growth of U.S. government contract services has increased the opportunities
for contractor misconduct (Roberts, 2010). The U.S Government uses contracting to
reduce cost; however, federal contractors operate with the opposite mindset of increasing
corporate profitability (Cordery et al., 2011). Corporations operate on a for-profit basis
and make decisions accordingly (Olusegun et al., 2011). Olusegun et al. (2011) believed
the desire for maximum profit was the leading cause of corporate misconduct. Cordery et
al. (2011) found that government contractors focused on solutions for government
problems that maximized their profits and not necessarily on the government’s priorities.
Kean (2011) produced historical evidence of corporate greed through the 1500% increase
in profits during WWII. Cordery et al. found that government contracting for healthcare
services has not delivered on the promise of reduced cost but increased cost by 60%. The
profitability gap between the government contracting industry and similar
nongovernment contracting industries increased since 1992 (Wang & San Miguel, 2012).
Knott (2011) believed contractor misconduct is derived from the U.S. government
structure. The U.S. functions as a republic and creates opportunities for misconduct
(Knott, 2011). Wang and San Miguel (2012) found that top government contractors
exercised political influence and a strong bargaining position to create opportunities for
their companies. Corporate influence is possible because the U.S. political system allows
contractors to employ lobbyists to influence the political system (Knott, 2011). Knott
believed that lobbyists used their influence to increase contractor profitability while
reducing the risk of enforcement for contractual misconduct. Howlett and Migone (2013)
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believed the federal government contracting industry’s ability to shape government
policy invites misconduct.
The misconduct environment has included a variety of opportunities (Knott,
2011). Dorey et al. (2012) found that improper cost estimating in 2009 resulted in a
doubling of the actual costs for procurements. Kean (2011) determined that contractors
used creative accounting practices to mask increased corporate profits during World War
II. Hayden et al. (2010) discovered that government contractors formed alliances to
reduce competition and increase corporate profits. Rogers (2010) believed the root of the
problem was that government-contracting companies weigh the costs of compliance
against the penalties for noncompliance and make the decision that creates the most
profit.
The U.S. government has recognized the misconduct atmosphere exists and has
taken steps to mitigate misconduct (Bhojwani, 2012). Bhojwani (2012) stated that the
U.S. government instituted self-reporting to deter instances of misconduct. The
mitigation steps have been ineffective because government lacks the ability to collect
data, perform analysis, and report contractor performance in a shared environment
(Bradshaw & Su, 2013). Bradshaw and Su (2013) believed the government has not
emphasized monitoring performance but instead focused on establishing ethical
contracting standards. Rogers (2010) believed the government’s focus was misguided.
The government may require corporations to acknowledge ethical standards; however, a
corporation’s ethical change emanates from within (Rogers, 2010). Rogers believed that
the government should monitor behavior while creating the impetus for change.
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Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2010) believed even Roger’s ideas have not changed
the environment because, despite the level of government involvement, contractor
performance will not change. Influencing change within any organization or industry
begins with understanding the different parts of the problem (Bell & Barkhuizen, 2011).
Contractor Misconduct Influencers
Government contractor misconduct has existed since government contracting
began (Kean, 2011). Kean (2011) believed that understanding where misconduct
originates is important to deterring future misconduct. Rogers (2010) found that the
government contracting process promoted contractor misconduct. Sonn and
Gebreselassie (2010) believed that government contractors condone misconduct to
increase profitability. Roberts stated that the U.S. government enables contractor
misconduct.
Contracting process influences misconduct. Understanding the different parts
of the government contracting misconduct atmosphere begins with understanding the
different types of contractors (Wang & San Miguel, 2012). Wang and San Miguel (2012)
determined that corporate ethics and corporate profits do not differ among diverse
business segments and various sized corporation. Removing segment and size from the
equation narrows the areas to create emphasis for change (Wang & San Miguel, 2012).
The federal government contracting industry consists of both for-profit and
nonprofit companies. Members of the public believe that nonprofits, or not-for-profit
corporations, are trustworthy and less prone to misconduct than for-profit companies
(Amirkhanyan, 2010). The belief that nonprofits are more trustworthy than for-profits
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created an unbalanced government oversight program that handles for-profit and
nonprofit corporations differently (Amirkhanyan, 2010). Amirkhanyan (2010) found that
the public’s trust in nonprofits allows for a decreased government emphasis on
performing contract oversight. The trust appears misplaced because nonprofit contractors
self-report misconduct at a 25% higher rate than for-profit companies (Amirkhanyan,
2010). There are focused efforts on oversight of for-profits while nonprofits are not a
priority unless there is reason to suspect misconduct (Amirkhanyan, 2010).
Government contracts range from purchases of less than $3,000 to contracts worth
billions of dollars (Rogers, 2010). Less complex contracts require lower degrees of
specialization, which in turn involves less government involvement and decreased
government oversight (Amirkhanyan, 2010). Less government oversight increases
opportunities for contractor misconduct to remain undetected and undeterred (Rogers,
2010).
Complex contracts require different contractors to team together to meet the
government’s requirement (Amirkhanyan, 2010). Amirkhanyan (2010) said the
government requires a bid response that consists of a prime contractor and a team of
subcontractors. Prime contractors win contract awards based upon their teaming approach
(Parker, 2010). Parker (2010) found that prime contractors take one of two actions once
awarded a contract. Prime contractors may continue with the proposed teaming and
perform tasks they are capable of while subcontracting selected services to other
contractors as indicated in the proposal (Parker, 2010). However, prime contractors may
choose to end teaming relationships to increase profitability (Amirkhanyan, 2010).
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Kidalov (2013) stated that prime contractors formed initial alliances for
competition then severed the teaming relationship once awarded a contract. Severing
subcontracts after a contract award complies with the FAR; however, severing fails to
meet the contracting program’s intent (Kidalov, 2013). Severing teaming agreements
counters the government’s intent to provide work to specialized subcontractors (Parker,
2010).
The prime/sub relationship makes contract oversight difficult (Rogers, 2010). The
U.S. government requires prime contractors to monitor and report subcontractor
performance (Kidalov, 2013). Moreover, Kidalov (2013) stated that prime contractors are
responsible for subcontractor performance and subject to penalties for subcontractor
misconduct.
Subcontracting increases the government’s exposure to misconduct by creating an
additional oversight layer (Kidalov, 2013). Kidalov (2013) found instances of misconduct
exist between a prime contractor and subcontractors, which included high overhead
charges, improper pricing, improper payment, and improper distribution of work. Prime
contractors may subcontract to individuals instead of companies to minimize their risk
(Calvasina, Calvasina, & Calvasina, 2011). Moreover, Calvasina et al. (2010) believed
that prime contractors subcontracted to individuals to reduce corporate overhead, create
additional profits, and distance the corporation from employee misconduct liability.
The types of contractor business models and teaming relationships are not the
only segments of the government-contracting environment that invite misconduct (Mori
& Doni, 2010). The contract bidding, contractor selection, and other contracting
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processes provide opportunities for misconduct (Bradshaw & Su, 2013; Mori & Doni,
2010). Contractor misconduct is not limited to awarded contracts but is present
throughout the proposal and bidding processes (Mori & Doni, 2010).
The government may inadvertently promote misconduct early in the contract bid
process through the contract vehicle selection (Amey, 2012). Contract bundling, the
combining of multiple contract requirements into one contract, exposes the government
to increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (Demessie, 2012; Dorey et al., 2012).
Demessie (2012) found that contract stacking and omnibus contracts create a limited
contractor pool that increases the propensity for profit gouging due to intercompany
agreements. Dorey et al. (2012) discovered that government contracts include financial
incentives designed to reduce government risk by promoting the meeting of cost
estimates and timelines. However, this tactic is not effective because contractors build in
overestimates of time and expenses in a bid to ensure they can meet the requirements for
incentives (Dorey et al, 2012). Contractors violate contract law when employees work
off-book hours to meet timelines and expenses (Dorey et al., 2012). The government’s
practice of short or limited response for proposal (RFP) times, as low as 5-days, limits the
pool for respondents and increases the opportunities for response errors that lead
contractor misconduct to hide the errors (Demessie, 2012).
Jensen (2010) believed the government contract bidding process is difficult to
navigate and led to contractor misunderstanding, which increased contract protests,
contract violations, and accusations of misconduct. Problems related to the complex
bidding process and short RFP times increased when the U.S. government implemented
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the electronic bidding process (Elmorshidy, 2012). Terman and Yang (2010) stated that
government risk reduction efforts increased contractor misconduct. Contractors
emphasize maximizing profits and reducing risk when replying to RFPs, which increases
the government’s risk and cost (Amirkhanyan, 2010; Terman & Yang, 2010).
Government contractors influence misconduct. The reasons for contractor
misconduct extend past the contracting process (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). Deterring
contractor misconduct requires the U.S. government create, impose, and enforce effective
measures against misconduct (Roberts, 2010). Understanding the atmosphere of
misconduct must include a review of how the federal government contracting industry
and the U.S. government inadvertently promoted misconduct (Roberts, 2010).
The SAM lists over 450,000 active registrants in the federal government
contracting industry database (FPDS, 2014). All contractors are required to abide by the
standards of ethical conduct outlined in the FAR (Roberts, 2010). Sonn and Gebreselassie
(2010) believed that contractor misconduct would continue to exist if all contractors
performed within the specifications outlined in certain government contracts. Calvasina
(2011) discovered that contractors continued to operate within the government’s
standards yet deceived government organizations by misclassifying employees, resulting
in billions of dollars in lost tax revenue. Sonn and Gebreselassie found that government
contractors violated employee pay and benefits regulations by paying less than the
required living wage.
Larger contracting organizations may have complex organizational structures
designed to render identification of affiliates and subordinates difficult to differentiate
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from subcontracting requirements (Thomas, 2012). Contractors provided incentives for
employees to develop personal relationships with influential government employees to
solicit unpublished information on contracting efforts (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010)
found that contractors used personal relationships to give government employees gifts,
which circumvented the FAR’s gifting prohibition.
The U.S. government attempted to decrease costs through increased competition;
however, increased contractor competition did not improve contractor performance
(Terman & Yang, 2010). Terman and Yang (2010) found that contractors decreased cost
estimates to receive contract awards then increased costs once awarded the contract;
thereby decreasing efficiency and increasing costs beyond projections. Thomas (2012)
described contractor deception that included companies with reputations for misconduct
that renamed and rebranded the organization; thereby, masking their negative history.
Uhoka (2013) believed that continued U.S. government attempts to influence contractor
ethical behavior are futile and that industry and corporate norms alone determine
corporate ethical behavior.
The U.S. government influences misconduct. Roberts (2010) argued that while
the U.S. government attempts to reduce misconduct, the government also fosters
contractor misconduct. Roberts found that senior government officials and military
officers transition to government contractor executive positions. Contractor incestuous
hiring practices skirt the FAR rules regarding the hiring of government employees and
create a propensity for operating outside ethical boundaries (Roberts, 2010). The FAR
allows for circumventing procurement regulations if extenuating circumstances are met
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(Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). Hansson and Holmgren (2011) believed circumventing the
FAR minimized cost savings and efficiencies, while increasing the potential for
contracting misconduct.
Restrictive or noncompetitive contracting actions increase the government’s risk
for misconduct (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). The U.S. government historically awards
20% of all contract efforts to the top five government contractors (Warnock, 2012).
Reliance on small numbers of contractors makes it difficult to enforce responsibility
standards (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). Dependence on a select few coupled with
familiarity created an atmosphere where government procurement agents show favoritism
and give preferential treatment to select contractors (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011).
Presidential administrations increase influence and power of the government contracting
industry by encouraging consolidation and mergers of contractors and further limiting
choices (Hayden et al., 2010).
Government officials influence contract awards beyond limiting competition
(Lewis & Bajari, 2011). The U.S. government contributed to misconduct by selecting
lower-cost bids (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). The government transitioned from the
low-bid strategy after determining that awarding to the lowest-bidder contributed to the
problem of contractor misconduct (Elyamany & Abdelrahman, 2010). Lewis and Bajari
(2011) found the U.S. government changed the awardee selection criteria from lowest
bidder to the lowest qualified bidder; however, the lowest qualified bidder failed to
improve contractor performance (Elyamany & Abdelrahman, 2010).
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The U.S. government transitioned to awarding contracts on the best value criteria,
which assigns values to criteria including price, technical approach, management plan,
and past performance (Elyamany & Abdelrahman, 2010). Elyamany and Abdelrahman
(2010) believed the best-value selection method discriminated against new and smaller
firms and fostered contractor misconduct. Bradshaw and Su (2013) found that
government procurement placed less emphasis upon a contractor’s past performance and
more on a promise of performance. Procurement officials viewed past performance as a
pass-or-fail and not a graduated scale (Bradshaw & Su, 2013).
The contract award process may foster misconduct; however, some contract
vehicles require contractor misconduct (Krishnan, 2011). Moreover, the U.S. government
condones and contributes to government contractor misconduct (Krishnan, 2011). The
U.S. government knowingly contracts services in an effort to undermine accountability
for unethical and illegal techniques and tactics involved in intelligence gathering
(Krishnan, 2011). Moreover, Krishnan (2011) stated that government requested that
contractors create false reports to justify a desired outcome.
The U.S. government encouraged unethical behavior in companies by requesting
contractors to perform illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance services
(Greengard, 2010). The U.S. government’s intelligence community (IC) promotes
corruption, inefficiency, and unethical practices, while shielding the contractor from
federal oversight and control (Greengard, 2010). Greengard (2010) determined that the
National Security Agency (NSA) accomplished the monitoring of U.S. citizens through
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contracts with U.S. telecommunication corporations that provided the government with
illegal access to private information.
The U.S. government promoted contractor misconduct by condoning unethical
behaviors (Gomez del Prado, 2011). Moreover, the U.S. government employed private
security contractors to distance the administration from hazardous policing and
peacekeeping situations (Gomez del Prado, 2011). Gomez del Prado (2011) found that
the security firms have committed violent and deadly acts resulting in poor cultural
relations and politically embarrassing situation for the U.S. government.
Private security firms have changed since 2001 by shifting from security guard
services to a mercenary role (Gomez del Prado, 2011). The U.S. government’s spending
on private security contracts has increased with the shifting in roles (Gomez del Prado,
2011). Gomez del Prado (2011) stated that the cost of security contractor misconduct
extended past money to lives and international goodwill. Private security contractors
were for-profit businesses that seek maximum profitability, which caused contractor
misconduct ranging from unauthorized use of deadly force, to acts of fraud, and
falsifying documents (Gomez del Prado, 2011).
The U.S. government’s inability to correct misconduct may be as harmful as
condoning misconduct (Mayrell, 2012). The U.S. government provides no defined
requirement for what constitutes an acceptable ethics program, and does not require the
contractor to submit the program for approval (Roberts, 2010). The lack of defined
requirements and contract vehicle complexity may render the government incapable of
litigating cases of contractor misconduct, thereby making settlement the best solution to
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recover as much lost revenue as possible (Mayrell, 2012). Furthermore, the U.S.
government may choose contract expiration over termination because the burden of proof
extends beyond contractor performance and includes the ability to improve (Loulakis,
2010). Warnock (2012) believed political agendas, biased enforcement of contracting
rules and regulations, and poor oversight compromise the U.S. government’s ability to
influence contractor misconduct.
Deterring Government Contractor Misconduct
Paternoster (2010) stated that deterrence theory is preventing illegal or unethical
acts through the threat of penalties for violations. O’Neil (2011) credited the U.S.
government’s nuclear deterrence policy of mutual assured destruction for preventing war
during the late 20th century. The nuclear deterrence policy was effective because the
Soviet Union believed the U.S. government watched for violations, could affect mutual
destruction, and would enforce the policy (O’Neil, 2011).
In government contracting, the U.S. government seeks to create an ethical
contracting atmosphere where contracting officials and contractors follow the rules and
strive to decrease costs and increase efficiency (Rogers, 2010). The U.S. government
creates rules, regulations, and guidance to establish ethical contracting business practices
(Rogers, 2010). Rogers (2010) believed that government contractor misconduct continues
despite the U.S. government’s deterrent actions. Best (2013) believed that effective
misconduct deterrent programs consist of prevention, detection, and prosecution.
Furthermore, compromising any of the three elements will result in an ineffective
government contractor misconduct deterrence program (Best, 2013).
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The U.S. government’s misconduct deterrence program includes rules and
regulations governing conduct, oversight in the execution of the contracted requirements,
and punishment for violations (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010). Problems exist with the U.S.
government’s current approach because establishing ethical rules and regulations does
not guarantee change in unethical behavior (Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, Roberts (2010)
stated that misconduct would continue to increase without a stringent government
oversight program. The U.S. government’s methods for identifying contractor
misconduct are ineffective, and determining responsible contractor behavior is difficult
(Roberts, 2010; Warnock, 2012). Enforcing misconduct violations is problematic and
fosters a legal environment where settlement and compromise are preferred (Young,
2010).
Government contractor oversight. Contractor oversight programs are vital in
the effort to deter misconduct (Thomas, 2012). Dickinson (2013) argued that oversight is
the foundation for accountability and prosecutions, and therefore a vital component of
deterrence. Oversight programs may prevent and detect misconduct, while informing
those responsible for enforcing policy (Best, 2013). Contractor oversight is one of the
government’s essential elements in deterring misconduct (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010).
The U.S. government performs contractor oversight in multiple ways. The
government appoints officials to provide contractor oversight (Butts, 2010). The U.S.
government outsources oversight to contractors and requires contractors to self-perform
oversight and report violations (Roberts, 2010). Dickinson (2013) believed that contractor
provided oversight is ineffective due to improper evidence gathering and the inability to
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prosecute misconduct. Observed and reported acts of misconduct inform the prosecutorial
phase of a deterrence program (Dickinson, 2013).
Effective deterrence programs require that individuals believe others will discover
their misconduct (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Ritchey and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) found
that the effectiveness of government-imposed speed limits to reduce speeding increased
as the number of highway patrol personnel increased. Moreover, the perception was that
the probability of detection affected behavior (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011).
Best (2013) stated that an effective oversight program is essential for deterring
government contractor misconduct. However, Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) believed
the government does a poor job of contractor oversight. Kilbride (2010) believed the U.S.
government is capable of improving contractor oversight through increased reviews of
contractors and contractor operations, which would reduce threat of contractor
misconduct. Terman and Yang (2010) found that the government seldom meets their
contract monitoring responsibilities; thereby increasing the likelihood of contractor
misconduct. Kilbride linked the U.S. government’s shortfalls in oversight to funding that
did not keep pace with contract spending. Furthermore, money saved through less
funding for oversight programs is lost through acts of contractor misconduct (Kilbride,
2010).
Government programs and acquisition regulations make government contractor
oversight operations difficult (Amey, 2012). The government’s self-imposed time limit
on contract audits is an example of policies that increased the government’s risk to
contractor misconduct (Wegryn & Killian, 2010). Amirkhanyan et al. (2010) believed the
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complexity of the contracting relationship determines the amount of oversight the
government maintains.
Mori and Doni (2010) believed the increasing complexity of government contract
construction increases the difficulty of monitoring contractor performance and reliance
on contractor self-reporting. Specialized contracts involve stronger governmental
relationships with the contractor and require increased oversight; however, lower degrees
of specialization result in decreased government oversight (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010).
Decreased government oversight, coupled with lack of institutional oversight and
discipline, creates the potential for contractor misconduct to go undetected and
unchecked (Amey, 2012). Deciding how much oversight, and how the oversight will be
conducted, is determined by U.S. government contracting officials (Butts, 2010).
Contracting officials may determine the particulars of contract oversight programs
but contracting officer representatives (COR) or contracting officer technical
representatives (COTR) perform the oversight (Butts, 2010). Contracting officials receive
training in contract law, contract administration, and contractor oversight (Karstrom,
2013). Government overseers are technically competent, versed in the technical aspects
of a contract, and able to provide proper oversight (Karstrom, 2013).
Butts (2010), unlike Karstrom (2013), believed government overseers, such as the
COR or COTR, are incapable of performing oversight. CORs are contract specialists not
technically proficient enough to provide proper oversight; COTRs, by contrast, are
technically proficient yet not trained in contract administration (Butts, 2010). Improperly
trained contractors and an improper oversight program led to contractor misconduct in
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human rights abuses in the Abu Ghraib military prison in 2004 (Krishnan, 2011). The
oversight ability gaps increase because CORs and COTRs have legal authority over the
contract yet lack legal supervisory authority over contractors (Krishnan, 2011).
Government supervisors should notify CORs of suspected contractor misconduct
(Judd, 2012). CORs should notify the government contractor executives, which have
legal authority over the individual contractor (Butts, 2010; Judd, 2012). Butts (2010)
believed the relationships between CORs, COTRs, and contractors are dysfunctional due
to serving different shareholders. The CORs and COTRs serve the U.S. government and
the American taxpayers, while contractors serve the corporation and corporate
shareholders (Butts, 2010).
The U.S. government implemented electronic record keeping for improved
oversight of contractor performance but the system is only as good as the information it
contains (Elmorshidy, 2012). Government organizations seldom share contractor
information despite the emphasis on centralized reporting of contractor performance
(Terman & Yang, 2010). Contracting officials' increased workloads result in lax
recordkeeping and diminished effectiveness of the electronic system (Elmorshidy, 2012).
Issues other than technical ability and workload negatively affect the U.S.
government’s oversight program (Boerner, 2011; Krishnan, 2011). The U.S. government
contracts services to decrease costs and increase efficiency; however, inadequate
oversight compromises these goals (Best, 2013; Roberts, 2010). The advanced
technology and secrecy involved in intelligence collection makes government monitoring
and oversight impossible (Krishnan, 2011). Moreover, Krishnan (2011) found the
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government could not account for 25% of Department of Defense (DoD) spending.
Boerner (2011) discussed the failure of existing government oversight and prosecution
initiatives involving medical contractors where two cases were prosecuted despite $1
billion in improper payments.
The U.S. government expanded contractor oversight to include government
involvement with authority beyond contracting officials, CORs, and COTRs
(Elmorshidy, 2012). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) oversees both
prime contractor and subcontractor performance (Lessack, 2013). Lessack (2013) found
the OFFCP’s oversight included contract employee wages, corporate hiring practices, and
the applicant interview process. The OFFCP issues a list of best practices and
recommendations for contractor performance to avoid potential misconduct allegations
(Lessack, 2013). Lessack found that the OFFCP cites instances of contractor misconduct;
however, they recommend enforcement actions and do not prosecute misconduct.
The government relies on contractors to perform oversight on themselves and
other contractors (Roberts, 2010; Young, 2012). The U.S. government has outsourced
specialized contract oversight to government contractors (Young, 2012). Furthermore,
Stegman (2010) found the government outsources the auditing of medical laboratory
claims to increase efficiency. The FAR requires contractors to create ethics programs and
corporate compliance positions to perform internal oversight (Roberts, 2010). Stegman
believed that requiring corporate positions and programs is not enough because corporate
compliance officers are not trained in auditing and incapable of monitoring compliance.
Amirkhanyan et al. (2010) believed that despite the level of oversight, government
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contractor misconduct would continue unabated. Moreover, increasing oversight does not
guarantee reduced misconduct (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010).
U.S. government deterrent steps and programs. The U.S. government requires
documented business ethics and conduct policies for contractors awarded contracts worth
more than $5 million (Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, the government requires all large
contractors to have a functioning corporate ethics program (Roberts, 2010). Roberts
(2010) stated that these programs and policies are implemented to reduce the costs
associated with contractor misconduct.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) attempted to improve contractor
performance, reduce fraud, and deter instances of misconduct by strengthening and
enforcing standards and regulations (Healthcare Financial Management Association
[HFM], 2011). The U.S. government’s handling of misconduct enforcement appears
inconsistent (HFM, 2011; Tillipman, 2013). Government officials believed that
contractors guilty of misconduct should be punished without regard for circumstances
(Tillipman, 2013). However, government officials maintained that considering selfreporting, type of misconduct, and contractor viability survivability, are important during
the deterrent prosecutorial process (Tillipman, 2013).
Government contracting officers are responsible for a contract’s administration,
modification, and termination (Judd, 2012). Moreover, the U.S. government provides
contractors the ability to elevate a contracting officer’s decision to an appellate body
(Judd, 2012). Judd (2012) found that the U.S. government’s own Court of Federal Claims
(CFC) or Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) overruled contracting officer contract

41
terminations or nonrenewals. The CFC and BCA have standards for supporting punitive
contracting actions. Judd believed the CFC’s and BCA’s standards promote seeking a
compromise solution that is acceptable to both parties.
The compromise solutions appear sufficient; however, compromising rules,
regulations, and prescribed punitive actions may reduce the desired deterrent effect (Best,
2013). Best (2013) illustrated this belief with an example of corporate deception and
fraud. A large government contractor formed a joint venture with a Service Disabled
Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) to win a SDVOSB set-aside contract award
(Best, 2013). The FAR (2014) requires that an SDVOSB company receive over 50% of
the tasks. In Best’s example, the SDVOSB received less than 1% of the work. The
contract termination was overturned and the BCA settled with the joint venture. The
Veterans Administration has since reported that fraud and abuse of the SDVOSB
program continues to be a major problem (Best, 2013). Best surmised that the legislative
changes in verification, designed for making debarment or suspension easier, and for
increasing misconduct penalties, were compromised by settlements.
The government provides legislative bodies outside of the CFC and CBA that
work to determine contractor accountability (Loulakis & McLaughlin, 2013). Each
legislative body uses unique parameters in determining accountability. The Armed Forces
Board of Contract Appeals reviews all contractor appeals in cases of government
penalties and takes performance, impact on the federal government, and impact on the
contractor into consideration during deliberations (Loulakis, 2010). Members of the
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals concluded that imposing penalties upon a contractor
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must go beyond the individual act of misconduct or nonperformance and show the
contractor did not act in good faith (Loulakis & McLaughlin, 2011).
The measure of in good faith is subjective and difficult to prove or disprove
(Loulakis & McLaughlin, 2011). The U.S. Court of Federal Claims established that
misconduct alone is not sufficient for sanctions against a federal contractor (Loulakis &
McLaughlin, 2013). Loulakis and McLaughlin (2013) determined that intent to perform
acts of misconduct must be present for the government to take action against a contractor.
Detractors in deterring contractor misconduct exist beyond compromise and
settlement (Brown, 2010; Cea & Stempler, 2010). The government subsidizes legal
challenges to contract deterrent actions (Brown, 2010). The FAR (2014) allows for
government reimbursement to contractors for breach of contract lawsuits. Financial
reimbursement is a win-win for the contractor (Brown, 2010). Brown (2010) found that
contractors are authorized to receive government reimbursement for legal fees and
settlement costs in cases of fraud against third parties. Protesting contract awards
increased due to increased competition and favorable consideration for protesting
expenses (Cea & Stempler, 2010). The U.S. government provides financial
reimbursement for contractor employee-based lawsuit settlements (Brown, 2010).
Furthermore, Brown found that the financial reimbursement for employee-based lawsuit
settlements included the contractor’s legal fees and settlement costs. The government’s
current reimbursement policies promote misconduct through subsidized legal expenses
without admitting wrongdoing (Brown, 2010; Cea & Stempler, 2010).
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Compromising government-imposed prosecutorial steps extends to holding
contractors accountable for intent and action (Cea & Stempler, 2010; Dorey et al., 2012).
Holding contractors accountable and responsible for providing what they promise, at the
price at which they promise, promotes realistic cost estimates and reduces actual
contracting costs (Dorey et al., 2012). The U.S. government seldom penalizes contractors
for underestimating costs (Dorey et al., 2012). Dorey et al. (2012) stated that when
contractors present added costs, the government may cancel the contract initiative, restart
the contract bid process, or pay the added costs. Dorey et al. believed the three options
present a loss of value regardless; therefore, the government requires weighing the cost
against the timeline and viability of the initiative before deciding the next step.
The U.S. government does not allow contractors to lose money on a contract; at
worst, contractors make no profit (FAR, 2014). The absence of contractor risk creates the
incentive to underestimate the perceived cost and increase the estimate after beginning
the work (Dorey et al., 2012). The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
requires that cost estimates be within 80% of actual costs; however, Dorey et al. (2012)
believed that Congress’s attempts to solve the cost estimate problem fail to address
contractors that submit cost proposals.
Underestimated contract costs are a type of purposeful contractor practice
designed to deceive the government and increase government contractor profits (Dorey et
al., 2012). Contractor fraudulent practices, following contract award, include improper
pricing and fraudulent billing practices (Martin, 2013). Fraudulent pricing strategies have
a long history in government contracting (Martin, 2013).
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The False Claims Act (FCA) is a Civil War era statute designed to hold
government contractors accountable for fraud (Martin, 2013). Martin (2013) found that
through enforcing the FCA, the U.S. government recouped an average of $3 billion
annually from 2009 to 2012. FCA-enforced settlements included government contractors
Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), Honeywell International, and Armor Holdings (Martin,
2013). The FCA provides financial incentives for private parties to report contractor acts
of misconduct by allocating a reward of up to 30% of any monies recovered (Roberts,
2010). The FCA’s punitive actions extend beyond the government contracting company
to the individual level (Martin, 2013). Martin stated that the FCA’s individual punitive
actions include contracting industry executive and employee fines, imprisonment, or
both.
The legislative bodies of the CFC and BCA, as well as legislative reforms like the
Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act or the FCA, are the U.S. government’s
attempts to deter contractor misconduct (Martin, 2013; Maser & Thompson, 2011; Titolo,
2011). The Competition in Contracting Act established the GAO’s authority to decide all
contract protests (Maser & Thompson, 2011). Protests can arise for a variety of reasons
and include contractor misconduct during the contract bid or award phase (Maser &
Thompson, 2011).
The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) empowered both
private citizens and the U.S. government to each have a role in policing contractor
behavior (Titolo, 2011). The courts interpreted how and when to apply FERA differently
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(Titolo, 2011). However, Titolo (2011) found that, in 2009, private citizens’ reports led to
$2.4 billion in recovered contractor misconduct assets.
In 2009, the Close the Contractor Fraud Loophole Act required federal
government contractors began to self-report misconduct (Warnock, 2012). Additionally,
in 2009, Congress established the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity
Information System (FAPIIS) as a component of The Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act of 2009 (Nackman et al., 2011). FAPIIS provides the government
equivalent to POGO’s Federal Contractor Misconduct Database (FCMD) that began in
2002 (Stanley, 2012). FAPIIS began as a government-only site in 2009; however, in
2010, Congress required including contractor self-reporting and public access (Stanley,
2012). FAPIIS assists contracting officials in choosing ethical contractors by providing
access to a consolidated contractor performance database (Willard, 2013). However, the
lack of detailed analysis of the information provided by FAPIIS renders the system
useless (Willard, 2013).
The Close the Contractor Fraud Loophole Act caused members of the FAR
Council to change the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2009 (FAR, 2008). The
change was designed to deter contractor misconduct (Dorey et al., 2012). The change
included mandatory contractor requirements for self-reporting of contractor misconduct,
creating ethics and compliance programs, and employee ethics and conduct training
programs (FAR, 2008). Furthermore, the FAR change included possible debarment or
suspension for discovered misconduct violations up to 3 years after a contract ended
(FAR, 2008).
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The government established the Truth-in-Negotiations Act to reduce contract
costs through proper bidding and increased competition (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010)
found that contractors conspired together during the bidding process to ensure a higher
price point; thereby rendering the Truth-in-Negotiations Act ineffective. Furthermore,
Rogers (2010) mentioned the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as a method of ensuring
contractors establish policies regarding employee wage requirements, work hour
limitations, employee treatment, and employee working conditions.
The Procurement Integrity Act of 1988 (PIA) prohibited government contract
employees and others from providing information outside of the proposal process
(Roberts, 2010). Contractors may be debarred, and individuals held civilly and criminally
liable for misconduct violating the PIA (Roberts, 2010). Tillipman (2013) stated that
debarment is the most severe government action available. Criminal convictions for
misconduct have a pointed effect, whereas debarment affects the entire contracting
company (Tillipman, 2013). Tillipman cautioned the necessity of serving the public
interest prior to instituting debarment and suspension. Tillipman believed that debarment
and suspension applied to contractors that do not take action internally against employees
guilty of misconduct.
The U.S. government’s contractor misconduct deterrent initiatives included
contracting rules and regulations, along with legislative bodies and acts (Best, 2013).
However, Best (2013) believed that the U.S. government promoted contractor
misconduct. The Reinvestment Recovery Act of 2009 funded $275 billion in additional
funding for U.S. government contracts designed to improve and support economic
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growth (Masino & McCurry, 2011). Masino and McCurry (2011) believed government
contracts funded by the Reinvestment Recovery Act fell outside of the FAR and other
government contracting regulations. Therefore, the lack of government regulatory
authority made enforcing contractor misconduct difficult (Best, 2013; Masino &
McCurry, 2011).
President Reagan spearheaded the effort promoting contractor self-regulation
(Roberts, 2010). President Reagan believed that contractors could regulate their ethical
behavior by instituting internal rules and organizations designed to improved ethical
behavior (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010) reported that in 2009, the U.S. government
began requiring government contractors to self-report misconduct violations to deter
contractor misconduct. Martin (2013) found that private citizens report more instances of
contractor misconduct than the federal government detected, which made self-reporting
appealing. The U.S. government increased reliance on contractor self-reporting by
relying on prime contractors to self-report subcontracting participation and misconduct
violations for all subcontractors (Kidalov, 2013).
The self-reporting requirement has critics (Thomas, 2012). Tillipman (2013)
found that the self-reporting requirement applies to all contractors. However, Thomas
(2012) believed that self-reporting requirements were responsible for some contractors
failing due to the lack of infrastructure or funding for the monitoring software or services
required. Kidalov (2013) believed that the U.S. government’s dependence upon
contractors’ self-reporting derogatory information on themselves and fellow contractors
is misplaced.
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The government’s self-reporting initiative included requiring contractors to list
past performance pertinent to the contract they are bidding (FAR, 2014). Bradshaw and
Su (2013) found that contractors selectively list past performance, including positive
reviews and omitting unfavorable reviews. Moreover, Clarke (2010) believed that
contractors omit or deceive when reporting unethical behavior. Kidalov (2013) found that
instances of contractor misconduct were double the self-reported misconduct for
hurricane Katrina recovery contracts.
Contractor self-reporting and other forms of oversight are ineffective if
misconduct is not prosecuted (Warnock, 2012). Warnock (2012) believed the government
should seek to reduce contracting costs through enforcement of ethical contractor
standards. Contract standards and corporate ethics programs inform and educate;
however, they do not prevent unethical behavior (Sadler-Smith, 2012). Corporate ethics
programs require external oversight, including government audits (Boerner, 2011).
Internally, organizational compliance programs require reviewing and updating to ensure
maximum effectiveness (Boerner, 2011). Martin (2013) cited the federal court system’s
inconsistency in interpreting and enforcing contractor self-reporting requirements.
Certain cases of contractor misconduct, such as hostile work environment and
employment discrimination, require internal prosecution (Mayrell, 2012). The
government’s diminished ability to enforce contractor ethical behavior standards reduces
the probability of contractor compliance (Martin, 2013). Deceptive practices within the
government contracting industry’s self-reporting practices caused the U.S. government to
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adjust the self-reporting processes to include a government verification process (Best
2013).
Summary
The governing, safety, and security of U.S. citizens are governmental functions
that the U.S. government should not outsource (Krishnan, 2011). However, the drive to
reduce the expense of keeping all governmental functions in-house creates a need to look
elsewhere for support (Terman & Yang, 2010). The U.S. government seeks to reduce
costs and improve efficiency through employing federal government contractors
(Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). The U.S. government’s contracting for goods and services
is essential to the continuity of government and vital to the national economy (Jenks,
2010; Masino & McCurry, 2011).
The U.S. government’s inability to function without contractors has diminished
the ability to control contractor misconduct (Knoll, 2011). The U.S. government’s
dependence upon contracting caused many, such as Senator McCaskill, to believe that the
government's deterrent steps do not restrain government contractor misconduct
(Tillipman, 2013). The government contracting industry lobby wields power and
influence throughout the branches of the government, thus creating a more profitable
contracting environment (Hayden et al., 2010). Kilbride (2010) stated that government
contractors are self-focused, profit-driven, and loyal to their companies instead of their
country. Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) believed contracting government services does not
reduce cost or maximize efficiency because contractors do not pursue innovation without
guaranteed payment.
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The U.S. government’s concern with saving money is contrary to the government
contracting industries' desire to maximize profits (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011; Kean,
2011). Sadler-Smith (2012) believed that humans make all decisions by processing
information and choosing what is beneficial. The government exercised Sadler-Smith’s
belief and provided financial incentives to promote cost-effectiveness within the general
population (Litsa, Petropoulos, & Nikolopoulos, 2012). Lewis and Bajari (2011) believed
that a similar financial incentive program would reduce contractor misconduct.
Furthermore, rewarding contractors that exceed contract requirements and penalizing
contractors that do not meet contract requirements would reduce contractor misconduct
(Lewis & Bajari, 2011). Lewis and Bajari believed that incentive program enforcement is
more important than incentive size.
The U.S. government’s deterrent actions towards government contractor
misconduct may result in increasingly complex contracting processes (Nagle, 2010).
Moreover, the complexity created by increased rules, regulations, and legislative actions
influences efficiency (Nagle, 2010). Terman and Yang (2010) determined that
contracting complexity led the government to monitor only 20% of government contracts
annually. Young (2010) believed government regulations and requirements documents,
filled with vague wording, make enforcement difficult and settlement preferable.
Throughout the last 100 years, legal volumes on government contracting guidelines have
increased from one volume covering the entire topic to individual volumes on dozens of
topics (Nagle, 2010).
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Roberts (2010) reported that misconduct decreased in the late 1990s to late 2000s
despite a doubling of contract spending; however, Roberts suspected the reduction in
reported misconduct was due to the decrease in oversight and accountability. Sonn and
Gebreslassie (2010) believed creating new federal contracting legislation would not
improve contractor behavior. However, the GAO believed that strengthening standards
and regulations would improve contractor performance, while reducing fraud and other
instances of misconduct (HFM, 2011).
Terman and Yang (2010) surmised that U.S. government contracting would
continue to thrive despite contractor misconduct and a lack of government monitoring.
Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) found evidence supporting Terman and Yang’s position
that unethical government contractors continue to win contract awards despite repeated
acts of misconduct. Tillipman (2013) believed the current government contracting system
effectively reduces contractor misconduct. Roberts (2010) found evidence supporting
Tillipman’s belief because contractor misconduct rates decreased from the late 1990s to
late 2000s.
U.S. government contracting and contractor misconduct began during the
Revolutionary War; however, the effect of government policies on contractor decisions
and behavior is unknown (Parker, 2010; Roberts, 2010). The academic community lacks
information on topics to include contracting and contractor misconduct (Wang & San
Miguel, 2012). In this study, I added to the academic research by studying the deterrent
effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 on reported government contractor misconduct
and the effect on the business process.
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Transition and Summary
Section 1 established the foundation for the business study. The section began by
presenting the study’s foundation and background of why government contractor
misconduct is a problem. The section next detailed the problem statement, purpose
statement, and nature of the study. Section 1 contained the stated research question and
associated hypotheses statements. The theoretical foundation is deterrence theory and a
list of defined terms was included in the section. Section 1 continued with a discussion of
the study’s assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. The significance of the study
followed with discussions on reducing the gaps in literature concerning the deterrent
effect of government actions towards contractor misconduct. Section 1 concluded with a
review of the professional literature that established the academic foundation for the
study.
Section 2 details the research phase of the project. The section begins with a
restatement of the study’s purpose. Section 2 continues by defining the role of the
researcher, and explaining the rational for selecting the participants, population, and
sampling methods. The section presented the reasoning behind choosing the study’s
research method and design. Section 2 concludes with details concerning the data
analysis technique and address reliability and validity. Section 3 presents the overall
study and study results. The section begins with an overview of the study and
presentation of findings. The section presents the implications for business practices and
social change. Section 3 concludes with recommendations for action and further study, as
well as reflections and summary of the entire study.
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Section 2: The Project
In the study, I sought to discover if the U.S. government’s actions designed to
deter federal government contracting misconduct were effective. The U.S. government’s
use of contractors to conduct inherent governmental functions continues to increase
despite continued instances of contractor misconduct and the widespread belief that
governmental deterrent steps do not restrain government contractor misconduct (Jenks,
2010; Knoll, 2011; Tillipman, 2013). The following discussion details the rationale
behind and framework for the study’s research phase.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative study was to (a) discover if the U.S. government’s change in 2009 to the
FAR has reduced the rate of reported contractor misconduct and (b) investigate the
impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 on federal government contractor ethics
business processes. The rate of reported government contractor misconduct and
government contractor ethics business processes were the two dependent variables. The
study presented secondary quantitative research collected from 2006 through 2012,
statistical contracting misconduct information collected from 2006 through 2012,
contracting articles, and government contracting studies.
Through data collection and analysis, I sought to determine if a causal
relationship existed between the change to the FAR in 2009 and the number of reported
acts of contractor misconduct by government contractors and government contractor
ethics business processes from 2006 through 2012. I used SPSS to determine the means
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from 2006 through 2008 (Time 1) and from 2010 through 2012 (Time 2). I sought to
determine if the government’s efforts in 2009 to deter contractor misconduct significantly
reduced the reported instance of government contractor misconduct and influenced
government contractor ethics business processes. The study findings indicated that the
change to the FAR in 2009 did not effectively reduce instances of reported contractor
misconduct; however, the findings did indicate that the change to the FAR significantly
influenced government contractor ethics business processes.
Role of the Researcher
My role as researcher for this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative study was determined by the study’s research method, research design, and
data collection method (DeForge, 2010). The primary research role was to collect data
from credible sources. Yu-Jia (2012) stated that assuring resource credibility is the
researcher’s responsibility.
The U.S. government provides online, publically available, and archival
information pertaining to contract awards and contractor misconduct. Online databases
include FAPIIS, SAM, and POGO. I did not collect unverified misconduct information
due to the unreliability of the information. I collected and organized data in a format
compatible to IBM SPSS Statistics Grad Pack version 20.0. I analyzed the data collected,
inferred results from the research and analysis, and recommended future research related
to contractor misconduct.
I have 20 years of experience working with government contractors. I have 10
years of experience as a COTR on both goods and services contracts. My COTR duties
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included supervising government contractors, reviewing invoices, evaluating contractor
performance, and reporting contractor noncompliance to the applicable contracting
officer. I have 10 years of experience as a government contractor. My government
contractor duties included procurement services, shipping and receiving, maintenance,
engineering services, operational planning, research and development, analysis, and
program management. My experiences as a government customer, a COTR, and a
government contractor create a balanced understanding of federal contractor misconduct.
Participants
Participants were not required for this study. I collected all required research data
from two U.S. government databases, SAM and FAPIIS, the government sponsored
database POGO, and official FPDS reports. The three databases contained publically
available information that included government contract awards, contractor performance,
and contractor misconduct. The information was compatible with SPSS. I correlated the
data by year and by contractor. The yearly breakdown included two groups. The first
group (preintervention) includes data from 2006 through 2008. The second group
(postintervention) includes data from 2010 through 2012. Contractors were limited to the
top 100 federal contractors by contract awards as listed in FPDS.
Research Method and Design
I intended to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 affected reported
government contractor misconduct (dependent variable) and the government contractor
ethics business process (dependent variable). Reported government contractor
misconduct and government contractor ethics business processes were the dependent
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variable while the 3-year groups, pre and post the change to the FAR in 2009, comprised
the independent variable. The quantitative research method and retrospective causalcomparative design was preferred because of the ex post facto cause-and-effect
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable (Brewer &
Kuhn, 2010; Yu-Jia, 2012). Furthermore, statistically measuring the independent variable
made causal-comparative the best design choice (Kraska, 2010).
Method
I used quantitative methodology to conduct my study of change to the FAR in
2009 on rates of reported government contractor misconduct, and contractor ethics
business processes, from 2006 through 2012. Quantitative methodology produces
descriptive results that measure numerical changes in the characteristics of a chosen
population (Kraska, 2010). Hypothesis testing determines if significant change has
occurred in quantitative methodology (Kraska, 2010). Kraska (2010) believed that
researchers use numerical and statistical results to infer generalized conclusions in
quantitative methodology. Researchers using qualitative methodology, unlike quantitative
methodology, rely on philosophical principles and not on numerical data for interpreting
results and providing reasoned conclusions (Staller, 2010; Weathers et al., 2011).
Qualitative researchers filter information through their values and beliefs that become
part of the analysis; however, quantitative researchers use statistical analysis without
inserting additional personal values into the analysis process (Kraska, 2010; Staller,
2010). My study included previously collected numerical data for inferring conclusions,
thus making quantitative methodology the preferred choice over qualitative methodology.
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Research Design
Selecting a research methodology was my first step in determining the study’s
design. Choosing quantitative methodology for my study led to selecting the appropriate
design. I selected nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-comparative design.
Quantitative methodology designs can be experimental, quasi-experimental, or
nonexperimental in design (DeForge, 2010). DeForge (2010) stated that researchers do
not manipulate variables in nonexperimental design; however, researchers do manipulate
variables in both quasi-experimental and experimental design. My study consisted of
historical data that render variable manipulation impossible, thus making
nonexperimental design the only acceptable quantitative design.
Nonexperimental design is preferred when researching a large group or when
measuring the effectiveness of a program (Lobmeier, 2010). My study was designed to
measure the U.S. government’s contractor misconduct deterrence program effectiveness
in a large population totaling more than 450,000 registered contracting companies.
Nonexperimental design consists of a number of different types of more narrowly
focused designs including comparative design, causal-comparative design, correlational
design, and one-group pretest-posttest design (Lobmeier, 2010).
Researchers use comparative design to compare two or more groups and
determine statistically significant differences (Lobmeier, 2010). Lobmeier (2010) stated
that retroactive causal-comparative design is an ex post facto design that researchers use
to compare differences in one or more groups before and after a manipulating a variable.
The quantitative researcher measures two or more nonmanipulated variables and
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determines if a relationship exists with a correlational design (Lobmeier, 2010).
Researchers select a one-group, pretest-posttest design to measure differences in a group
over time, with one measure before and one measure after manipulating a variable
(Lobmeier, 2010).
In my study, I compared the differences in reported federal contractor misconduct
before and after the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009. The single group of
federal government contractors made selecting either comparative design or correlational
design untenable. I compared the median for a 3-year period before and the mean a 3year period after an intervention. Siami and Gorji (2011) conducted a causal-comparative
study of a telecommunications company using ex post facto data to infer a cause-andeffect relationship. Liang, Fulmer, Majerich, Clevenstine, and Howanski (2012) selected
causal-comparative design to measure differences between two groups over an 8-year
period. The ex post facto nature, single participant group, and multiyear comparison were
components of my study’s causal-comparative design.
Population and Sampling
Individuals were not required to participate in the study. I collected historical data
on reported federal government contractor misconduct from 2006 through 2008 and from
2010 through 2012 in my ex post facto research design. POGO employees collect
contractor misconduct data and POGO maintains a database supporting the U.S.
government contractor oversight program and U.S. government contracting officials
(Warnock, 2012). The U.S. government requires contracting officials to deposit all
reported federal contractor misconduct into the FAPIIS database (Warnock, 2012). The
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U.S. government lists 450,000 active federal government contractors (FPDS, 2014). The
contractors listed range from microbusiness to large companies with thousands of
employees (Roberts, 2010). POGO collects and maintains datasets on the top 100
contractors annually (POGO, 2014).
I used purposive sampling to determine my sample group. Huck et al. (2010)
defined purposive sampling as the intentional selection of a homogeneous subset from a
larger population. I selected the top 100 government contractors for each year studied to
represent the larger group of 455,000 active, registered contractors (FPDS, 2014). The
top 100 federal government contractors varied year-to-year for the years covered in the
study. The top 100 government contractors included 182 different contractors from 2006
through 2008 and from 2010 to 2012. The top 100 government contractors were awarded
between 53.9% in 2010 and 58.1% in 2008 (see Figure 1) of all government contract
awards for years covered in the study (Federal Procurement Data System [FPDS], 2014).
My intentional selection of the top 100 government contractors met Huck et al.’s
(2010) purposive sampling method. Furthermore, the study’s subset of the top 100 federal
government contractors met Muskat, Blackman, and Muskat’s (2012) requirement that a
representative population must be large enough to generate sufficiently representative
data. U.S. government contract spending varied during the years selected for the study
from a low of $404 billion in 2006 to a high of $531 billion in 2011 (see Figure 2).
Contract awards for the top 100 government contractors varied during the same time
period from a low of $220 billion in 2006 to a high of $303 billion in 2008 (see Figure 3).
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Despite the varying amounts for contract awards, the top 100 government contractors
were awarded greater than 50% of all contract awards (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Government contract award percentages. This graph represents the contract
award percentages for the top 100 and outside the top 100 government contractors during
2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
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Figure 2. Contract award values. This graph represents the contract award values for all
government contractors, in millions, annually from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through
2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).

61

$350,000.0
$300,000.0

$303,689.8

$284,651.8

$294,768.5

2008

2010

2011

$284,716.3

$248,278.1

$250,000.0
$220,321.6

$200,000.0
$150,000.0
$100,000.0
$50,000.0
$0.0
2006

2007

2012

Figure 3. Top 100 contractor contract award values. This graph represents the contract
award values for the top 100 government contractors, in millions, annually from 2006
through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
The data originally collected by POGO and stored in FAPIIS represented a variety
of goods and services provided by the federal government contracting industry. Two
eligibility requirements existed for inclusion in the purposive sample group. Participants
were registered in SAM as active members when data collection occurred, and
participants were listed in the top 100 federal contractors according to the FPDS annual
contractor report (FPDS, 2014). The sample size, representing 55% of all contract awards
for the periods listed, represented the federal government contracting industry and met
Meckstroth’s (2012) requirement that a study’s inferred results accurately represent the
larger industry.
Ethical Research
The study does not contain information gathered from individual participants. The
lack of individual participants rendered consent forms, incentives, withdrawal processes,

62
confidentiality agreements, and cooperation agreements unnecessary. POGO permits
public access to their federal contractor misconduct reporting records. The U.S.
government’s FAPIIS database is accessible to the public. Public access to the two data
sources selected for this study rendered written permission unnecessary. POGO and
FAPIIS collect, control, manage, and secure all data used in this study. Data collected for
this study are stored on an external storage device and secured in my home safe when not
in my possession. Federal government contractor names were removed and replaced by a
generic numerical code accessible only on the external storage device.
Wester (2011) believed that researchers must use ethical practices throughout the
study process. The institutional review boards (IRBs) are responsible for ensuring
researchers conduct studies ethically (Chappy & Gaberson, 2012). IRBs ensure that a
researcher follows policies, procedures, ethical practices, and laws (Chappy & Gaberson,
2012). Furthermore, IRBs ensure a study participant’s ethical treatment. I sought and
received Walden University’s IRB approval, IRB approval number 07-17-14-0340399,
before beginning the study’s data collection and analysis phase. I complied with the
IRB’s guidance and with Wester’s belief that researchers must follow strict ethical
guidelines throughout the study process.
Data Collection
Instruments
POGO’s data collection instrument is a digital corruption reporting form that is
accessible to anyone seeking to report suspected contractor misconduct outside of official
government channels (POGO, 2014). Individuals reporting misconduct are required to
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answer a series of eight open-ended questions. The questions cover eight separate areas
required for the allegations investigation and verification. The areas include the
government agency involved, specific misconduct incident, status of the incident, request
for evidence, awareness of breadth of misconduct behavior, others told of the incident,
others aware of the incident, and any actions taken against the individual reporting the
incident. Reported misconduct is investigated and verified by qualified POGO employees
before inclusion on POGO’s misconduct database. Investigative techniques include
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, interviews, and legal document searches.
POGO employees transfer valid reports of contractor misconduct to POGO’s contractor
misconduct database, and link investigatory data to each reported misconduct incident
listed in POGO’s database. POGO secures the misconduct report information database
inside of the POGO facility.
Two government databases provide the information available on the FAPIIS
database (FAPIIS, 2014). Government contracting officers must complete annual reports
on all contracts under their supervision (Warnock, 2012). The COR or COTR completes
a two-item, yes or no, quantitative questionnaire (FAPIIS, 2014). The information
requested in the questionnaire includes verification that the contractor is a prime
contractor with a current contract and an active registrant in SAM, and reported or
alleged misconduct incidences within the past 5 years (FAPIIS, 2014). Government
contractors are required to complete the same questionnaire annually when registering as
an active business in SAM (FAR, 2014). The U.S. government requires contracting
officers and contractors to complete a spreadsheet detailing misconduct incidences
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occurring within the previous 5 years, and then post the information in the Contractor
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) database. (FAPIIS, 2014;
Warnock, 2012). FAPIIS extracts questionnaire and spreadsheet data from both SAM and
CPARS and compiles the information into a publically available spreadsheet
encompassing applicable misconduct information reported since April 15, 2011
(Warnock, 2012).
In 1995, POGO founders responded to the general public’s opinion that federal
contractors may be corrupt and began operating the contractor misconduct database
(POGO, 2014; Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). POGO employees created the Federal
Contractor Misconduct Database (FCMD) in 2002 to hold the U.S. government and
contractors accountable for fraud, waste, and abuse (Stanley, 2012). POGO’s contractor
misconduct database provides an alternative to government or contractor employees who
want to report misconduct without fear of reprisal (POGO, 2014). POGO employees link
data available on the publically accessible misconduct database to legal findings and
other credible sources (Staley, 2012).
The U.S. government created FAPIIS under The Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act of 2009 (Warnock, 2012). Willard (2013) stated that the U.S.
government created FAPIIS to increase transparency in the contracting process. Congress
intended FAPIIS to improve contractor responsibility by improving contracting officials’
awareness of contractor performance and reducing instances of misconduct (Nackman et
al., 2011; Warnock, 2012). FAPIIS is the government-controlled repository of reported
contractor misconduct information (Willard, 2013).
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I collected data from both POGO and FAPIIS databases to compile a list of
reported incidences of government contractor misconduct. FPDS’s annual contractor
reports list the top 100 federal contractors for each year studied (FPDS, 2014). The two
databases, compiled according the contractors listed in FPDS’s annual reports, comprised
the reported instances of government contractor misconduct. I collected data from the
SAM database and FPDS annual reports pertaining to government contractor’s
establishment of corporate ethics programs.
I added the number of instances of reported misconduct for the top 100
contractors in 2006, 2007, and 2008. I computed the median for each year and the overall
median for the 3 years. Moreover, I computed the median for 2010, 2011, and 2012; next,
I computed the overall median for 2010 through 2012. I used the Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test to determine how much the rate of reported misconduct declined after the change to
the FAR in 2009.
I collected data from POGO, SAM, and FPDS to determine the level of the top
100 contractors’ ethics programs before and after the change to the FAR in 2009. The
FAR (2014) part 32.203.13 requires that corporate ethics programs include four parts: (a)
a formal corporate ethics program, (b) a written code of business ethics and conduct, (c)
ethics awareness and compliance training, and (d) an internal noncompliance reporting
process. I assigned a numerical value, ranging from 0 to 4, corresponding with the
number of requirements that each contractor met. I added the scores and computed the
medians for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012. I computed the median for the 3
years prior to 2009 and for the 3 years following 2009. I used a Wilcoxon signed-ranks
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test to determine how much government contractor corporate ethics business processes
changed after the change to the FAR in 2009.
Data Collection Technique
The GAO collected misconduct data in two separate organizations, CPARS and
SAM, and combined the data into one publically available database called FAPIIS
(Warnock, 2012). POGO collected misconduct data from sources reluctant to report
incidences into the government system for fear of reprisal (Staley, 2012). Each
organization does not allow access to misconduct information prior to verifying the
information through recognized investigatory techniques (Warnock, 2012). Data I
collected from FAPIIS and POGO were properly vetted and each misconduct instance
and supporting documentation traced from reporting through legal finding.
The data collected contained categories that include the contractor’s name,
contracting agency, type of misconduct, legal finding, and reported date of misconduct.
The categories and data organization allowed for targeted reporting on instances of
misconduct by any of the top 100 federal government contractors. I did not run a pilot
program because FAPIIS data are collected through the government’s contractor
misconduct data collection program, and POGO’s data collection program has existed
since 1995.
Data Organization Techniques
FAPIIS data are available in Excel spreadsheet format. POGO data are available
through an online database format that required entry into an Excel spreadsheet format.
Contractor ethics business process data in FPDS and SAM were in reports that required
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transcription into Excel spreadsheet format. I organized the data into two datasets of
annual reported federal contractor misconduct; from 2006 through 2008 (Time 1) and
from 2010 through 2012 (Time 2). Moreover, I categorized the number of instances of
misconduct into six columns organized by year. I processed the data through Statistical
Program for Social Science (SPSS) Statistics Grad Pack version 20.0.
I categorized the contractor ethics business processes data into six columns. The
first three columns included years 2006 through 2008 (Time 1). The last three columns
included years 2010 through 2012 (Time 2). I assigned a value to each contractor
indicating the level of presence of a corporate ethics program. The values correlated with
the number of corporate ethics program requirements met, ranging from 0 to 4.
Study data are stored on an external drive and secured within my personal
fireproof safe. I removed contractor names from the data collected and substituted a
numeric code that I secured in my personal safe, separately from the external drive. I will
secure all data collected and analyzed for a period of 5 years post study completion.
Data Analysis Technique
I did not use a survey for data collection in this quantitative, causal-comparative
study. The ex post facto datasets consisted of instances of federal government contractor
misconduct from 2006 through 2012. The Close the Contractor Fraud Loophole Act in
December 2008 caused a change to the FAR in 2009 (intervention) that required
contractor self-reporting (Warnock, 2012). Furthermore, the self-reporting requirement
was the government’s attempt to deter contractor misconduct (Warnock, 2012). Two
matched groups of participants, separated by time (independent variable), were measured
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in two time periods that were divided by the change to the FAR in 2009 (intervention). I
used data from 2006 through 2008 (Time 1) to represent preintervention, and data from
2010 through 2012 (Time 2) to represent postintervention instances of reported contractor
misconduct (dependent variable) and government contractor ethics business process
(dependent variable).
SPSS is an accepted statistical analysis tool (Yu-Jia, 2012). SPSS allowed for
determining if a cause-and-effect relationship existed between the rates of reported
federal contractor misconduct preintervention and the rates postintervention. I used the
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test in SPSS to determine if the reported misconduct was
significantly reduced after the change to the FAR in 2009. Moreover, I used the
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to determine the impact of the change to the FAR in 2009
effected government contractor ethics business processes. The annual top 100
government contractor misconduct data from the 3-year groups pre and post the change
to the FAR in 2009 were added together (n = 300).
My null hypotheses were (H10) that there was no significant decline in the rate of
reported contractor misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009 and (H20) there was
no statistically significant change in government contractors ethics business processes
after the change to the FAR in 2009. U.S. government officials changed the FAR in 2009
to deter contractor misconduct (Warnock, 2012). The effectiveness of those actions could
be related to deterrence theory. The data collection, organization, and analysis enabled
me to infer results that answer both the stated hypothesis and the theoretical framework.
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Reliability and Validity
Reliability
Reliability is the repeatability of the research findings in quantitative
methodology studies (Farrelly, 2013). The data analysis technique is reliable if other
researchers have used the same or similar technique and reached the same results. I used
matching and Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for analysis. Brewer and Kuhn (2010)
recommended these two techniques for causal-comparative research design. My study
was similar in that I sought to determine if the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in
2009 reduced misconduct or changed government contractor ethics business processes. I
compared the rates of reported misconduct from before and after the change to the FAR
in 2009 to determine if reported misconduct declined by more than 5%. Furthermore, I
compared changes in government contractor ethics business processes before and after
the change to the FAR in 2009 to determine if contractor ethics business processes
changed by more than 5%.
Researchers must take care to (a) avoid biases that interfere with data collection
or (b) misrepresent the data collected (Farrelly, 2013). Moreover, Farrelly (2013)
believed that researchers should seek confirmation of data from two separate sources if
looking at historical or precollected data. I collected data from three sources, POGO,
FPDS, and FAPIIS, which gathered information from a variety of sources to capture
reported federal government contractor misconduct and contract awards. Moreover, I
collected data from three sources, SAM, POGO, and FPDS, to understand changes in
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government contractor ethics business processes. Research personal bias did not
influence the collection of this empirical data.
Farrelly (2013) believed the researcher must be credible and qualified. I meet
these requirements through 20 years of experience in federal government contracting on
both the U.S. government side and the government contractor side. I served as a trained
COR, COTR on multiple contracts and in various positions as a government contractor. I
conformed to Farrelly’s (2013) belief that quantitative research includes both numeric
and verbal explanations of findings. I used approved research methods, designs,
techniques, and procedures to ensure reliability.
Validity
Reliability is vital but unattainable without validity (Farrelly, 2013). Validity
measures the investigative quality of the research in a quantitative study. Thorkildsen
(2010) stated that validity is simply an argument that supports a concept by using data.
The complexity of an argument does not determine validity. The ability to answer the
research question completely determines validity. The argument can be as simple as
determining between a yes and no. My study was an argument to determine if the U.S.
government policies to reduce misconduct have been effective. The hypotheses phrased
the question and required a simple yes or no response.
Farrelly (2013) defined validity as the ability to reach the same result given the
same data. DeForge (2010) stated that validity is a measure of the truthfulness of a
researcher’s inferences. Controlling threats to validity reduces the researcher’s risk in
producing false inferences. The inferable nature of quantitative research requires
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mitigating the applicable threats to validity to ensure the validity of research results
(Petrocelli, 2010). Four threats to validity exist: internal, external, statistical conclusion,
and construct validity (DeForge, 2010).
Internal validity focuses on events during the experiment that influence the
research variables (DeForge, 2010). The threat events pose alternative reasons for
resultant outcomes. Mitigating or eliminating these events was key to establishing
validity for my study. In my study, I inferred results based upon the U.S. government’s
deterrent initiatives against contractor misconduct. I reviewed anomalies within the top
100 contractors and searched for additional influences such as change in corporate
leadership or corporate policies outside of those prescribed by U.S. government
regulations.
Lobmeier (2010) defined internal validity in nonexperimental design as the
determination that there is not more than one explanation for the resultant. Random
selection of participants reduces the threat to nonexperimental validity (Lobmeier, 2010).
In my study, the participant group was randomly selected through meeting a set
performance criteria. The participants were the top 100 federal contractors in the value of
contract awards for the applicable year. Lobmeier listed the manipulation of groups
through researcher bias and variance in data collection as additional threats to validity. In
my study, the groups were predetermined by contract award while the data collected was
historical records that did not change over time, thus reducing threats to validity.
External validity is concerned with the applicability of theory to the experiment
results (DeForge, 2010). External validity was vital to my applying deterrence theory to
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infer causal correlation between the change to the FAR in 2009 and (a) the reduction in
the rates of reported government contractor misconduct, or (b) the changes in government
contractor ethics business processes. External validity is important to a researcher who
desires to generalize results from a target group to wider group (Leighton, 2010).
Threats to external validity include random sampling and variances within the
population selected (Leighton, 2010). Random sampling is vital to external validity. The
participant group in my study was randomly selected by contract award as defined within
FPDS to become a part of the top 100 federal contractors. The specific criteria for
inclusion in the sample group, a top 100 contractor by contract awards, meets Leighton’s
(2010) goal for increasing external validity through narrowly defined criteria. The top
100 contractors provided a variety of goods or services accounting for 55% of
government contract awards; however, the FAR applies to all government contractors
equally (Warnock, 2012). Therefore, according to Warnock (2012), any variance within
the population’s business offering should not influence the contractor’s propensity for
adhering to or ignoring the ethical rules imposed by the U.S. government.
Statistical conclusion validity differs from internal and external validity in that it
refers to events that influence the relationship between the research variables (DeForge,
2010). Statistical conclusion validity requires that a researcher base inferred results on the
studied variable and not on other variables (Mendoza & Marcus-Mendoza, 2010).
Quantitative research results are statistically significant or are not statistically significant
(Petrocelli, 2010).
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Petrocelli (2010) stated that statistical conclusion validity is threatened either by
rejecting a true null hypothesis (Type I error) or not rejecting a false null hypothesis.
Quantitative researchers require that the probability of the conclusions statistical
significance be less than 5% (Petrocelli, 2010). I used a one-tailed test to measure the
statistical significance of the reduction in the rate of reported misconduct after 2009. The
one-tailed test determines statistical significance when testing one side of a t-distribution
(Stone, 2010). I used a two-tailed test to measure the statistical significance of the change
in government contractor ethics business processes after 2009. Stone (2010) stated that
the two-tailed test determines statistical significance when testing two sides of a tdistribution. Mendoza and Marcus-Mendoza (2010) stated that equalizing two or more
groups into one matched group achieves statistical conclusion validity.
Petrocelli (2010) believed that Type II errors that threaten validity included small
sample size, varying sample selection criterion, and using an inappropriate statistical test.
The federal government contractor industry offers a wide variety of goods and services;
however, purposive sampling of the pool without regard for variety and combining them
into one matched group using the top 100 criteria mitigated the Type II error threat (Huck
et al., 2010; Petrocelli, 2010). The study pertained to the entire industry and the variable
of change to the FAR in 2009 applied to the government contracting industry without
regard for goods and services (Warnock, 2012).
The last of DeForge’s (2010) threats to validity was construct validity. Markus
and Lin (2010) defined construct validity as the collection of evidence intended to
support a nondirectly observed variable using specific research tools. Construct
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deficiency and construct-irrelevant variance are the two threats to construct validity
(Markus & Lin, 2010). Construct deficiency happens when the research tool fails to
measure the desired construct. Construct-irrelevant variance exists when the tool
measures the information that is not relevant to the construct.
Markus and Lin (2010) believed careful examination of the desired tool coupled
with inspection of the resultant would enable the researcher to verify construct validity. I
originally examined the results before and after the change to the FAR in 2009 with the
paired-samples t test (Stone, 2010); however, after determining that the differences
between the samples violated the required assumptions, I changed to a nonparametric test
of similar design. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is similar to the paired-samples t test,
but the nonparametric test does not have the restrictive outlier assumptions of the pairedsamples t test (Gao, 2010). The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was the appropriate tool for
determining the significance of differences between matched groups before and after an
intervention (Sawilosky, 2007). I used the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to measure the
change in contractor ethics business processes by comparing the business processes
before and after the change to the FAR in 2009. In my study, I compared the rates of
reported misconduct and measured the change in government contractor ethics business
processes by the top 100 contractors before and after the change to the FAR in 2009.
Transition and Summary
Section 2 detailed the research phase of the project. The section began with a
restatement of the study’s purpose to determine if a causal relationship exists between the
change to the FAR in 2009 and the number of reported instances of contractor
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misconduct. Section 2 continued by defining my data collection role as the study’s
researcher. The section contained the rational for not requiring the selection of study
participants or individuals. The section included explanations for selecting quantitative
methodology and retrospective causal-comparative design. In Section 2, I explained
selecting the top 100 federal contractors and the purposive sampling technique. The
section included details about POGO’s data collection instruments and the U.S.
government’s data collection procedures. I addressed selecting matching and Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test for analysis, and the reliability and validity implications and steps
required.
Section 3 presents the overall study and study results. The section begins with an
overview of the study and presentation of findings. I discuss how the findings may
improve the government contracting industry’s business practices and implications for
social change. The section contains listed recommendations for action and further study.
Section 3 concludes with my reflections on and summary of the entire study.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) found reported misconduct in 80% of the top 100
government contractors. Moreover, POGO (2014) listed 60 of the top 100 government
contractors with multiple violations. The U.S. government changed the FAR in 2009 to
reduce misconduct violations through increased oversight, expanded enforcement
authority, and new mandatory business processes for the government contracting industry
(OSBP, 2011; POGO, 2014). I conducted this study to determine if a causal relationship
exists between the change to the FAR in 2009 and (a) the number of reported acts of
contractor misconduct by government contractors and (b) government contractor ethics
business processes.
Overview of Study
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative study was to (a) discover if the U.S. government’s change in 2009 to the
FAR has reduced the rate of reported contractor misconduct and (b) investigate the
impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 on federal government contractor ethics
business processes. Two 3-year time groups, pre (Time 1) and post (Time 2) the U.S.
government’s change to the FAR in 2009, comprised the study’s independent variable.
The rate of reported government contractor misconduct, and government contractor
ethics business processes are the two dependent variables. I created two research
questions, one for each independent and dependent variable relationship, to aid in
determining the study findings. Null and alternative hypotheses were established to
answer each research question.
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I developed Research Question 1 to find if the change to the FAR in 2009 reduced
the rates of reported government contractor misconduct. The alternative hypothesis (H1a)
stated that there is a statistically significant decline in the rate of reported misconduct
after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null hypothesis (H10) stated that there was no
statistically significant decline in the rate of reported contractor misconduct after the
change to the FAR in 2009. I conducted a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of the data
collected for the 3 years before 2009 (Time 1) and the 3 years after 2009 (Time 2). The
results indicated that the null hypothesis was not rejected, p = .34 (see Table 2).
Therefore, the change to the FAR in 2009 did not significantly reduce the rate of
contractor misconduct.
I developed an alternative and null hypothesis to aid in answering if the change to
the FAR in 2009 affected government contractor ethics business processes. The
alternative hypothesis (H2a) developed for Research Question 2 stated that there is a
statistically significant change in the government contractors ethics business processes
after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null hypothesis was that there was no
statistically significant change in the government contractors’ ethics business processes
after the change to the FAR in 2009. I conducted a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of the data
collected for the 3 years before 2009 (Time 1) and the 3 years after 2009 (Time 2). The
results indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected, p < .001 (see Table 6). Therefore,
the change to the FAR in 2009 significantly changed government contractor ethics
business processes.
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Presentation of the Findings
Roberts (2010) stated that the change to the FAR in 2009 was implemented to
deter contractor misconduct. I conducted this quantitative, nonexperimental,
retrospective, causal-comparative study to determine how the rate of government
contractor misconduct (dependent variable) and changes to government contracting
industry ethics business processes (dependent variable) were impacted by the change to
the FAR in 2009. I collected, organized, and used SPSS analytic software to analyze the
data. The findings to Research Questions 1 and 2 follow.
Research Question 1
The rate of government contractor misconduct was the dependent variable for
Research Question 1. The independent variable for Research Question 1 was time, with
two conditions. Each condition pertained to a 3-year period of time, Time 1 (pre change
to the FAR in 2009) and Time 2 (post change to the FAR in 2009).
The rate of reported acts of misconduct by government contractors is the first
dependent variable. The research question for this dependent variable was designed to
investigate if the change to the FAR in 2009 reduced the rates of reported government
contractor misconduct. The data indicated that the number of reported acts of misconduct
studied ranged from a low of 32 in 2012 to a high of 124 in 2007; however, no trend was
apparent between 2007 and 2011 (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Top 100 contractors misconduct. This graph represents the reported instances
of misconduct annually for the top 100 government contractors from 2006 through 2008
and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
Data collected from FAPIIS were not as informative as I anticipated; therefore, I
relied on data collected from FPDS and POGO, which I compared with FAPIIS data. The
information available on FAPIIS was limited to either a yes or no answer pertaining to
contractor misconduct within the last 5-years. No quantification data existed in FAPIIS
and the reliability of FAPIIS is questionable because 45% of the top 100 contractors
covered in the time frame of the study with instances of misconduct after 2010 did not
report any instance of misconduct to FAPIIS (see Figure 5).
The research data indicated a variety of conclusions to reported government
contractor misconduct. Reported contractor misconduct resulted in 62.6% of settlements
by the contractor without admitting fault, while 1.2% of the government contractors were
suspended or debarred (see Figure 6).
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Figure 5. FAPIIS reporting compliance. This graph represents government contractor
FAPIIS reporting compliance from 2010 through 2012 (FAPIIS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
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Figure 6. Top 100 misconduct outcomes. This graph represents the percentage of
resultant actions for acts of contractor misconduct from 2006 through 2008 and from
2010 through 2012 (POGO, 2014).
I developed an alternative and null hypothesis to aid in answering Research
Question 1. The alternative hypothesis (H1a) stated that there is a statistically significant
decline in the rate of reported misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null
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hypothesis (H10) stated that there was no statistically significant decline in the rate of
reported contractor misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009. I conducted a
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing the data collected for the 3 years before 2009
(Time 1) and the 3 years after 2009 (Time 2). The results indicated that the null
hypothesis was not rejected, p = .34. Therefore, the change to the FAR in 2009 did not
significantly reduce the rate of contractor misconduct.
I determined that my original choice for analysis, the paired samples t test, was
inappropriate after discovering that the data violated the assumption of normality, p <
.001 (see Table 1). Therefore, I shifted to the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. The Wilcoxon
is a nonparametric test of similar design test that allowed for data that did not meet the
paired samples t test assumptions.
Table 1
Shapiro-Wilk Test: Test of Normality for Reported Contractor Misconduct

RCM Time 2 – RCM Time 1

Statistic
.862

df
300

P
< .001

Note. RCM = reported contractor misconduct; Time 1 = 2006 through 2008; Time 2 =
2010 through 2012.
The selection of the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test required reviewing three
assumptions to ensure appropriateness. First, each pair of observations represented
members of the top 100 government contractors for their respective times and were
independent of all other pairs of observations. Next, the 300 paired values (see Table 3)
was a large enough group to yield accurate z test results. Finally, while there were 128
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ties (see Table 3), there were 172 nontied scores from the 300 pairings (see Figure 7);
thereby mitigating the risk of continuous and symmetrical scores within the population.

128

Tied
Not Tied

172

Figure 7. Pie chart of tied pairs. This is the graphic representation of the tied pairedgroups for the 3-year time periods before and after the change to the FAR in 2009.
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the change
to the FAR in 2009 on the rate of reported government contractor misconduct. The
independent variable was time, with two conditions, Time 1 and Time 2. Time 1 was pre2009 (2006 – 2008) and Time 2 was post 2009 (2010 – 2012). The results indicated that
the rate of reported government contractor misconduct was not significantly impacted by
the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -0.949, p = .34 (see Table 2), N = 172, r = -.072 (see
Table 3); therefore, the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant decline
in rate of reported contractor misconduct was not rejected. The median score for reported
contractor misconduct higher before the change to the FAR in 2009 was 83.88, while the
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median score for reported contractor misconduct higher after the change to the FAR in
2009 was 89.82 (see Table 3).
Table 2
Test Statisticsa: Reported Contractor Misconduct
RCM Time 2 –
RCM Time 1
Z
-.949b
p (2-tailed)
.343
Note. RCM = reported contractor misconduct; Time 1 = 2006 through 2008;
Time 2 = 2010 through 2012.
a
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.
b
Based on positive ranks.
Table 3
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Reported Contractor Misconduct

RCM Time 2 – RCM
Time 1

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

N
96a
76b
128c
300

Median score
83.88
89.82

Sum of ranks
8052.00
6826.00

Note. RCM = reported contractor misconduct; Time 1 = 2006 through 2008;
Time 2 = 2010 through 2012.
a
RCM Time 2 < RCM Time 1.
b
RCM Time 2 > RCM Time 1.
c
RCM Time 2 = RCM Time 1.
Paternoster (2010) explained that in implementing deterrence theory, laws are
created, violations discovered, and penalties imposed, all with the desire of modifying
behavior. The change to the FAR in 2009 was created with the desire to reduce
misconduct (Dorey et al., 2012). Roberts (2010) stated that problems exist with the U.S.
government’s approach to ethics rules and regulations, which may result in no change.
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The finding that there was no significant decline in the rate of reported contractor
misconduct despite the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009, supported
Roberts’ belief while disconfirming Dorey et al.’s (2012) conclusions.
The findings further supported Robert’s (2010) belief that changing ethical rules
and regulations does not guarantee change in unethical behavior. Detection of misconduct
is a key component of deterrence theory (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Through the findings,
I detected misconduct and inferred that the oversight component of the U.S.
government’s deterrent actions was functional. However, the lack of significant reduction
in misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009 infers that the U.S. government’s
deterrence actions were not completely functional. Moreover, because the change to the
FAR in 2009 did not significantly reduce reported acts of misconduct, I questioned the
impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 on the government contracting industry
implementation of the required ethics programs.
Research Question 2
The second dependent variable was the government contractor ethics business
processes. I designed Research Question 2 to aid in investigating how the change to the
FAR in 2009 affected government contractor ethics business processes. I categorized the
data to indicate compliance scores for each year studied. Compliance scores ranged from
a score of 0, for no components, to a score of 4, for all four components of a viable
contractor ethics program as required by the change to the FAR (2008). Upon
categorizing the data, I found that the number of the top 100 government contractors with
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a compliance score of 4 ranged from a low of 6 in 2006, to a high of 78 in 2008 and 2009
(see Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Top 100 scoring a 4. This graph represents the number of top 100 government
contractors with all four elements of ethical business programs outlined in change to the
FAR in 2009 from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO,
2014).
Government contractor employment of each individual element varied; however,
the 2006 remained the lowest scoring year, while 2010 remained the highest scoring year.
Contractors with a formal ethics program ranged from 6 in 2006 to 80 in 2010 (see Figure
9). Contractors with a written code of ethics ranged from 57 in 2006 to 92 in 2010 (see
Figure 10).
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Figure 9. Top 100 with an ethics program. This graph represents the top 100 government
contractors with formal ethics programs from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012
(FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
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Figure 10. Top 100 with a code of ethics. This graph represents the number of top 100
government contractors with a written code of ethics from 2006 through 2008 and 2010
through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).

87
Contractors with a corporate ethics and compliance training program ranged from
17 in 2006 to 78 in 2010 (see Figure 11). Government contractors with internal
noncompliance reporting processes ranged from a low of 22 in 2006 to a high of 83 in
2010 (see Figure 12). Finally, the research data indicated a 433% increase in functional
ethics programs to comply with the change to the FAR in 2009; increasing from 18 with
all four parts of a functional ethics business program (see Figure 13) to 78 in 2010 (see
Figure 14).
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Figure 11. Top 100 with ethics training programs. This graph represents the number of
top 100 government contractors with ethics training programs from 2006 through 2008
and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
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Figure 12. Top 100 with internal compliance processes. This graph represents the
number of top 100 government contractors with internal noncompliance reporting
processes from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
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Figure 13. 2008 ethics program compliance. This graph represents the number of top 100
government contractors with all four elements of ethical business programs outlined in
change to the FAR in 2009 in 2008 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
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Figure 14. 2010 ethics program compliance. This graph represents the number of top 100
government contractors with all four elements of ethical business programs outlined in
change to the FAR in 2009 in 2010 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014).
I developed an alternative and null hypothesis to aid in answering Research
Question 2. The alternative hypothesis (H2a) developed for this research question stated
that there is a statistically significant change in the government contractors ethics
business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null hypothesis was that
there was no statistically significant change in the government contractors’ ethics
business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009.
My second research question centered on prevention and detection, which are two
of the components that Best (2013) listed as essential components of deterrence theory.
The dependent variable for Research Question 2 was government contractor ethics
business processes. The independent variable for Research Question 2 was time, with two
conditions, Time 1 (pre change to the FAR in 2009) and Time 2 (post change to the FAR
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in 2009). I initially chose to analyze the data through a paired samples t test; however, I
determined that the paired samples t test was inappropriate after discovering that the data
violated the assumption of normality. Therefore, I chose the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test,
which is a nonparametric test of similar design test that allows for data that violates the
paired samples t test assumptions.
Table 4
Shapiro-Wilk Test: Test of Normality for Contractor Ethics Business Processes

GCEBP Time 2 – GCEBP Time 1

Statistic
.886

df
300

P
< .001

Note. GCEBP = government contractor ethics business processes; Time 1 = 2006 through
2008; Time 2 = 2010 through 2012.
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test required reviewing three assumptions to ensure
appropriateness. First, each pair of observations represented members of the top 100
government contractors for their respective times and were independent of all other pairs
of observations. Next, the 300 (see Table 5) paired values was a large enough sample size
to yield accurate z test results. Finally, while there were 42 ties, there were 258 nontied
differences (see Figure 15), which indicated a low risk of noncontinuous and
asymmetrical scores within the population.
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Figure15. Pie chart of tied pairs for RQ 2. This is a graphic representation of the tied
pairs distribution for the contractor ethics business processes pre and post the change to
the FAR in 2009.
I conducted a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to evaluate the impact of the change to
the FAR in 2009 on changing government contractor ethics business processes. The
independent variable was time, with two conditions, Time 1 and Time 2. Time 1 was pre2009 (2006 through 2008) and Time 2 was post-2009 (2010 through 2012). The results
indicated that government contractor ethics business processes were significantly
impacted by the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -12.263, p < .001 (see Table 6), N = 258,
r = -.763 (see Table 5); therefore, the null hypothesis that there was no statistically
significant impact in government contractor ethics business processes after the change to
the FAR in 2009 was rejected. The median score for government contractor ethics
business processes that were higher before the change to the FAR in 2009 was 73.40,
while the median score for government contractor ethics business processes that were
higher after the change to the FAR in 2009 was 133.14 (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Contractor Ethics Business Processes

GCEBP Time 2 –
GCEBP Time 1

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

N
Median score
a
26
73.40
227b
133.14
47c
300

Sum of ranks
1908.50
30222.50

Note. GCEBP = government contractor ethics business processes;
Time 1 = 2006 through 2008; Time 2 = 2010 through 2012.
a
GCEBP Time 2 < GCEBP Time 1.
b
GCEBP Time 2 > GCEBP Time 1.
c
GCEBP Time 2 = GCEBP Time 1.
Table 6
Test Statisticsa: Contractor Ethics Business Processes
GCEBP Time
2 – GCEBP
Time 1
Z
-12.263b
p (2-tailed)
< .001
Note. GCEBP = government contractor ethics business processes;
Time 1 = 2006 through 2008; Time 2 = 2010 through 2012.
a
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.
b
Based on positive ranks.
Dorey et al. (2012) found that the U.S. government implemented the change to the
FAR in 2009 to deter contractor misconduct. The findings in Research Question 1
inferred that change did not have the desired impact. The findings to Research Question 2
inferred that the government contracting industry’s functional ethics business processes
were significantly impacted. Paternoster’s (2010) belief that in implementing deterrence
theory, laws are created to modify contractor behavior was supported by the increase the
median score changes in government contractor ethics business processes from 73.40
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before 2009 to 133.14 after 2009. Deterrence theory worked in spurring change in
contractor business processes; however, the changes did not lead to significant reductions
in reported contractor misconduct. The findings support Stegman’s (2010) belief that
changing business processes does not guarantee change in corporate behavior. The
findings extend the literature on government contractor ethics business processes, on
contractor ethical behavior, and how the two are not necessarily related. The findings
extend the understanding of the application of deterrence theory in modifying contractor
behavior, including what was and was not effective.
Applications to Professional Practice
The U.S. government has continued to take steps to deter contractor misconduct,
including the change to the FAR in 2009 (Roberts, 2010). The U.S. government’s
deterrent actions include imposing new rules and regulations governing conduct, creating
additional oversight programs, and expanding punishment for violations (Amirkhanyan et
al., 2010). U.S. government contracting officials, as well and government contracting
industry executives may benefit from understanding the study findings to infer the level
of success of the change to the FAR in 2009.
Dorey et al. (2012) stated that the U.S. government contracting officials designed
the change to the FAR in 2009 to deter contractor misconduct; however, no academic
information was available that determined if the change had the desired effect. Research
Question 1 in the study addressed the lack of information on the trend of misconduct post
the change to the FAR in 2009. Through interpreting the findings, I increased the
knowledge base for the contracting industry through understanding that reported
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contractor misconduct has not significantly declined despite the deterrent steps taken.
Government contracting officials and contracting industry executives may use the
findings to seek ways to reduce misconduct beyond the steps already taken. The findings
for Research Question 2 indicated that the U.S. government’s deterrent steps significantly
impacted the contracting industry’s ethical business processes. Government officials may
take the knowledge in understanding what was effective and apply similar techniques to
improve upon what was unsuccessful.
Two of the three essential elements of deterrence theory, prevention and
detection, were addressed by the change to the FAR in 2009 (Best, 2013; Roberts, 2010).
Moreover, the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009 supported Paternoster’s
(2010) belief that laws are created with the desire to modify behavior. The findings
indicated that the government contracting industry made significant increases in their
corporate ethics programs and therefore significant changes in their business processes.
Stegman (2010) believed that implementing required corporate programs do not create
change in corporate ethical behavior due to training shortfalls. The finding that the
contracting industry implemented significant changes in ethics business process coupled
with the finding that no significant change occurred in the rate of reported misconduct
supports Stegman’s (2010) assertion that changing business processes does not guarantee
a change in corporate behavior. Contracting industry executives may look at the findings
and determine ethical training shortfalls and design training improvements that may lead
to significant reductions in contractor misconduct.
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The application of deterrence theory in the case of reducing contractor
misconduct was made apparent through data collection and analysis. Deterrence theory is
the threat of applying penalties to prevent illegal or unethical acts (Paternoster, 2010).
The U.S. government contracting officials created a change to the FAR in 2009 to
prevent future government contractor acts of misconduct (Roberts, 2010). The data
indicated a 433% increase in functional corporate ethics programs, from which I inferred,
true to deterrence theory, that corporate behavior was modified comply with the new
regulation and prevent the U.S. government from applying penalties for noncompliance.
Government officials can use similar deterrent steps to further modify contracting
industry behavior.
Bradshaw and Su (2013) determined that misconduct mitigation steps were
ineffective because of the U.S. government’s lack of emphasis or inability to monitor,
report, and share contractor performance information. Government contracting officials
and contracting officers may improve the use and complexity of the existing contracting
oversight programs. Furthermore, the contract violations enforcement areas of the U.S.
government may improve violation enforcement, including enforcing the appearance of
continued misconduct. The data indicated that the majority of reported contractor
misconduct was settled without admitting fault, while 1% received the maximum
punishment possible. Rogers (2010) believed that the government contracting industry
places the highest value on profitability and comply only when profitability is threatened.
U.S. government officials may use the findings to determine if increased cost for
violations would reduce acts of misconduct.
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The findings may provide the federal government contracting industry with
information to aid in reducing or deterring misconduct. The findings may inform leaders
throughout the federal government contracting industry on the trends in contractor
misconduct and government oversight. Rogers (2010) found that while the government
may require corporations to acknowledge ethical standards, true corporate change is
created internally (Rogers, 2010). Industry leaders may use the finding to understand that
the current form of ethical business processes are insufficient and can investigate ways to
improve; thereby, significantly reducing acts of misconduct as was the intent of the
change to the FAR in 2009. Corporate leaders may investigate trends within their
organizations and seek to improve ethical behavior through internal deterrent actions.
The study findings may provide researchers, academicians, and U.S. government
contracting officials with information on the effectiveness of deterrence theory to modify
corporate ethical behavior. Academic investigation into successful application of
deterrence theory in other areas such as speed limits (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011),
corporate anti-trust actions (Lande & Davis, 2011), nuclear deterrence or mutually
assured destruction (O’Neil, 2011), and information security policies (Chen et al., 2012)
demonstrate the effectiveness of deterrence theory. Researchers and academicians my
review the findings and recommendations for further study to investigate the continued
acts of misconduct and further educate the U.S. government and government contracting
industry.
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Implications for Social Change
The implications for positive social change include the potential to improve
corporate ethical behavior throughout the organization. The study data indicated
instances of increased corporate social ethics programs as components of their ethics
business processes. Improving corporate ethics business processes may lead to improved
ethical conduct throughout the organization, which benefits all stakeholders, including
society (DeCremer et al., 2010).
The findings indicated a significant impact in government contractors increased
ethics business processes. The threat of reduced contracts for noncompliance coupled
with the increase in ethics programs support Demessie’s (2012) belief that corporations
would change if the cost of not changing exceeds the cost of change. Further academic
understanding may lead to increased public awareness campaigns that would impact the
contracting industry’s bottom line, which could improve corporate ethical behavior.
The findings indicated that government contractor misconduct was not
significantly reduced by the change to the FAR in 2009. The findings, coupled with
Cragg et al.’s (2012) belief that instances of misconduct are not confined to a single area,
lead to the conclusion that unethical conduct may be a problem throughout an
organization. Increased awareness of insignificant improvement in misconduct may lead
to further actions designed to reduce misconduct; thereby improving ethical behavior
throughout corporations and the government contracting industry.

98
Recommendations for Action
The findings indicated that the change to the FAR in 2009 significantly impacted
government contracting industry ethics business processes; however, the change did not
attain Dorey et al.’s (2012) stated goals of reducing contractor misconduct. I propose
recommendations for both the U.S. government contracting officials and government
contracting industry executives. The recommendations include three recommendations
for the U.S. government contracting officials and two recommendations for government
contracting industry executives as a result of the findings.
First, I recommend that the U.S. government contracting officials seek to improve
oversight programs, such as FAPIIS, by requiring self-reporting of violations to be listed
individually; thereby improving contracting officials understanding of a contractor’s
ethical profile. Next, government contracting officials should review the instances of
reported misconduct, compare the results with the information posted in FAPIIS, and
recommend punitive action against noncompliant contractors. Finally, I recommend the
government impose penalties that will reduce misconduct. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (2014) lists penalties for contractor misconduct, which includes exclusion
from the bidding process, fines, debarment, and criminal prosecution.
The study data indicated that 37.4% of reported instances of misconduct resulted
in imposed penalties (see Figure 14). Deterrence depends upon a government contractor
believing acts of misconduct will be detected and the cost of the action to be greater than
the potential profit (Paternoster, 2010). The U.S. government ability to deter contractor
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misconduct depends upon the likelihood of detection and increased cost to the
government contractor for the act of misconduct.
I recommend that government contracting industry executives improve internal
misconduct reporting and publish misconduct statistics within annual reports. The study
data indicated that ethical compliance programs are present in 78% of the top 100
contractors since the change to the FAR in 2009 (see Figure 13); however, there was no
significant reduction in acts of misconduct after the implementation of the ethical
compliance programs. The findings support Sadler-Smith’s (2012) conclusion that
corporate ethics programs inform and educate; however, unethical behavior persists.
Industry executives should review the findings, determine if their corporate ethics
programs are reducing misconduct, and revise the ethics program to improve ethical
behavior. Amey (2012) believed the government contracting industry poorly performs
internal oversight. I believe that improving internal oversight and reporting the results to
corporate stakeholders could improve internal compliance and reduce instances of
misconduct. Moreover, the government’s desire to reduce costs may lead to future
changes that could threaten corporate profits for those who fail to prepare.
Recommendations for Further Study
My causal-comparative study findings determined that the change the FAR in
2009 significantly impacted government contractor ethics business processes, yet did not
significantly reduce reported contractor misconduct. I recommend three studies that
would further academic understanding of the contractor misconduct issue. First, I
recommend a comparative study to discover if there is a significant difference in the rates
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of reported misconduct between contractors with high settlement percentages versus
contractors that experience punitive actions. This study would further the understanding
of deterrence theory in government contracting, specifically if punishment produces
compliance.
Next, I recommend a qualitative study of government contracting industry
executives to determine the perceived level of believed probability of detection and threat
of punishment. This study would measure the two aspects required in deterrence theory;
the likelihood of detections and the belief that punishment for violations will exceed
reward (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010; Qing et al., 2011). Understanding the perception of the
government contracting industry executives may further understanding of why the change
to the FAR in 2009 did not significantly reduced contractor misconduct. Finally, I
recommend further exploration of contractor misconduct through a case study approach.
Academicians may expand this research by studying companies with greater levels of
misconduct or lesser levels of misconduct. Individual contractor based case studies would
enhance the understanding of both academia and industry on government contractor
misconduct and corporate ethical behavior.
Reflections
Investigating government contractor misconduct and government contracting
industry ethics programs was both interesting and enlightening. Learning the history of
government contracting, contracting misconduct, and government steps to deter
misconduct enhanced my understanding of the topic. With over 20 years of experience in
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government contracting, I had preconceived notions of what to expect prior to conducting
the study.
I chose quantitative methodology to limit my potential bias. Moreover, I selected
a causal-comparative ex post facto design that required no participants; thereby
eliminating effects or interactions with participants. I used official government and
government watchdog databases as the source for all data used in the analysis. The
potential for personal bias was limited to post analysis. I expected the acts of misconduct
to remain the same or increase after the change to the FAR in 2009 and was surprised to
find that misconduct had declined, albeit insignificantly. I interpreted the findings based
upon unbiased analysis; therefore limiting any personal bias to explaining the findings.
I assumed that government databases would provide adequate data for my study;
however, my experience with FAPIIS did not meet my expectations. I anticipated
collecting valuable data from FAPIIS; however, I found that almost half of the
contractors studied did not report derogatory information in FAPIIS. I agree with Willard
(2013) that the database was an unreliable source for information.
The information gained and understanding obtained during this study spurred
further curiosity. I am excited to see progress in reducing misconduct despite that the
progress is not statistically significant. Understanding and improving corporate ethical
behavior is my passion. The next phase of my research will be to understand corporate
executive decision making in the area of ethical compliance. I look forward to learning
more and to working to further improve the ethical climate within the government
contracting industry.
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Summary and Study Conclusions
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causalcomparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 has influenced the
rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact of the change on
government contractor ethics business processes. Time, divided into 3-year time periods
pre and post the change to the FAR in 2009, was the independent variable. The instances
of reported contractor misconduct and the change in federal contractor ethics business
processes were the dependent variables. I used Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests to analyze
the data and infer the relationships between the study variables.
Demessie (2012) believed that U.S. government officials created regulations
designed to decrease misconduct, yet the regulations increased the propensity for
misconduct. U.S. government contracting officials changed the FAR in 2009 to deter
future instance of misconduct (Roberts, 2010). Effective deterrence begins with an
individual’s belief that discovery of the misconduct is likely (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010).
The second component of effective deterrence requires that punishment for misconduct
must exceed the potential reward for misconduct violations (Qing et al., 2011).
Deterrence theory has proven effective in deterring nuclear war (O’Neil, 2011), in
reducing instances of speeding (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), in limiting corporate
antitrust actions (Lande & Davis, 2011) and in information assurance policies (Chen et
al., 2012).
The deterrent effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 met with mixed results in
the study. The study findings indicate that reported acts of misconduct declined after the
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change to the FAR in 2009; however, the change was not significant. Further findings
indicated that the change to the FAR in 2009 created significant change on the
government contracting business processes. Kim and Lambright (2010) believed that the
level of government involvement does not change contractor behavior. The findings
dispute Kim and Lambright by indicating a significant change in contractor ethics
business processes. Bell and Barkhuizen (2011) stated that influencing change within an
organization begins with understanding the problem. Finding that U.S. government
regulations can influence the government contracting industry provided evidence that the
misconduct problem is correctable; however, the task of significantly reducing
government contractor misconduct remains.
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